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Dedication

To Afghanistan’s mountains, rivers, trees, and animals; whose existence is more
Afghan, whatever ‘Afghan’ means, and more human than nationalism
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Abstract
Nationalism in Afghanistan has not received attention from the scholars of the
country despite its significance, at least locally. Using a post-modernist analysis of
nationalism, this thesis will study nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of colonial
knowledge, class, and cultural institutions between 1901 and 1929. Chapter one is about
colonialism and its impact on nationalism in Afghanistan. In the nineteenth century,
colonial activities constructed the political, epistemological, and territorial foundation of
Afghan nation. Chapter two shows how previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan
have explained nationalism in the country. As the review of the previous studies of
nationalism in Afghanistan will show, the previous explanation is hegemonic and statecentric. Chapter three, the primary findings of this thesis, is a study of the reforms in
education and its relationship to development of nationalism in Afghanistan. As a result
of the reforms in education, the Afghan state was able to produce and patronize a wellcomposed class of roshanfekran or elites in Kabul. Chapter four is about the symbols and
Amanullah Khan’s eight month world tour that became useful tools of the Afghan state
and the nationalists to legitimate their nationalistic programs inside and outside
Afghanistan. In the conclusion, the thesis draws attention to its findings, and suggests that
further studies of nationalism in Afghanistan will be useful; especially studies that will
address the relationships between class, ethnicity, and language and nationalism in
Afghanistan.
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Introduction
(Figure 1)
Afghanistan’s and its Surrounding Countries Political Map
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1

"Afghanistan Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online." University
of Texas Libraries. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html (accessed February 22,
2012).
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(Figure, 2)
Afghanistan’s Current Administrative Divisions
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Ibid
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The Argument

This thesis’s argument is twofold. One is that nationalism in Afghanistan was a
colonial idea, though the Afghan state and nationalists adopted it locally as an Afghan
idea. The creation of an Afghan nation was more a British, Russian, and Persian
consensus than an Afghan one. Throughout the nineteenth century and long afterwards, it
was these colonial powers, particularly the British, who arranged among themselves to
create an Afghanistan. Indeed, the area that is “now known as Afghanistan,” as one study
wrote, “had no previous existence as a united, independent political unit” before the
beginning of the twentieth century.3 Another study has also concluded that “Afghanistan
is in fact a colonial construct in political, economic, and intellectual terms, at least.”4A
last but not least argument is made by a scholar of the country that the very labels
“Afghan” and “Afghanistan” are constructed by the foreigners, not the Afghans
themselves.5 However, Afghan nationalists rejected the argument that Afghanistan was
constructed colonially. They claimed that Afghanistan existed as a nation not only in the
nineteenth century but also since “man came down from the caves and hills to the fertile
banks of rivers and civilized valleys, which the soil of Ariana, the ancient Afghanistan,
was one of these valleys.”6 The second part of this thesis’s argument is that nationalism

3

Benjamin D. Hopkins, The making of modern Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), 11-13.
4
Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and
State Formation in a Colonial Frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
5
Mohammad J. Hanifi, “Editing the Past: Colonial Production of Hegemony Through
“Loya Jerga” in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies. 37, no. 2 (2004), 322
6
Ahmad Ali Kohzad, Tarikh-e Afghanistan: The History of Afghanistan (Kabul: Matb-e
Maiwand, 2008), 12. For a similar and more specific assertion by the Afghan nationalists see Mir
Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar’s Afghanistan Dar Masir Tarikh: Afghanistan in the Course of

4

in Afghanistan was a state-sponsored and elitist idea. Its practitioners—the nationalists—
were a small elite group that was patronized by the state. Unfortunately, this thesis will
not focus on the ordinary people. Rather, it concentrates on the Afghan elites and their
nationalistic works. Therefore, the entire discussion about nationalism in Afghanistan is
not about the ruled Afghans, the dominated Afghans, and the unknown Afghans. The
only hope, which this thesis has, is to find out about them and remember them while it
discusses the ruling, the dominating, and the known Afghans.
Defining Nationalism in Afghanistan

From the turn of the twentieth century until the year 1929, nationalism in Afghanistan
was noticeable in the hegemonic institutions of the Afghan state—schools, newspapers,
laws, and national public ceremonies such as the National Unity Day, Independence Day,
Loya Jerga or the Grand Assembly—and writings of Afghan nationalists. The concept of
“hegemony” means here “that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas.”7
Indeed, when the twentieth century started, the Afghan state began not only to legitimate
its rule by force, but also by ideas. These ideas were instituted in the state’s hegemonic
institutions such as the schools, the army, and the ceremonies that propagated an
‘Afghan’ national idea. The country’s first constitution (1923) defined and territorialized
Afghan nationality in its article eight: har sekha nafar-e che pa mulk da afghanistan ka
de, pa har din aw mazhab che wee, tabean aw da rayat da afghanistan balal kizhee. This
new national idea, “that everybody who was residing in Afghanistan without regards to

History (Kabul: Markaz Nashr-e Enqelab, 1987), 9 and 36-38. In these pages Ghobar dates the
history of Afghanistan as old as 2,500 B.C.
7
Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and The Theory of Hegemony,” Journal of the History of
Ideas, 36, no. 2 (1975), 351
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their religious beliefs and affiliations was an Afghan citizen,” is one example of the
development of nationalism in Afghanistan during the early decades of the twentieth
century.8
While this new national idea that everybody-is-Afghan and Afghanistan is da
afghanano watan or the homeland of Afghans was propagated by the Afghan nationalists
as the foundation for national unity and identification,9 they also disregarded the
argument that Afghanistan was a colonial construct. Eein watan-e aziz Afghanistan or
this dear homeland of Afghanistan, wrote Kabul,10 “has been neither the land of
Persians, nor Turks, nor Indians, and nor Chinese.”11 This kind of expression that
Afghanistan has always been an Afghan land was in clear contrast with the country’s
historical and political as well as intellectual characterization. It has been traditionally
identified and argued by the outsiders12 that Afghanistan was a creation of the British and
Russia. In the nineteenth century the British view or policy was to create the modern
territory of Afghanistan as a ‘buffer’ polity between British India and Russia to prevent
any Imperial Russian advances eastward towards India. Russia, on the other hand, viewed
the creation of a ‘buffer’ Afghanistan as a barrier to keep the British away from Central
8

Government of Afghanistan, Asasi nizamnamah da luwar dawlat Afghanistan:
Afghanistan’s Constitution, (Kabul: Matb-e Shirkat-e Rafiq, 1923), 5
9
Ghobar (1987), 794
10
Kabul was the literary magazine of Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul, the Kabul Literary
Society that was established in 1931. Kabul magazine and Salnamah-e Kabul, Kabul Annual, the
two Persian publications of Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul, were established to “reform and consolidate
the methodologies and forms of literature” in Afghanistan and “write” the history of the historical
poets of Afghan nation. See Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul’s Salnamah-e Kabul (1932) 109.
11
Ghulam Jilani Khan Azimi, “Nazar-e ba Jughrafya-ye Watan: An Opinion about
Geography of the Homeland,” Mujala-e Kabul, (1932-33), 42
12
Hopkins (2008), 61-62 and 108-110. See also Vartan Gregorian’s The Emergence of
Modern Afghanistan (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 118. Gregorian offers a useful
but short discussion of the “buffer” idea of an Afghanistan.

6

Asia. However, the Afghan nationalists rejected the argument that Afghanistan was
created by Britain and Russia. For them, Afghanistan was a tarikhi-e Afghanistan or the
ancient Afghanistan, which existed as a nation prior to the nineteenth century’s British
and Russian colonial activities in the country. They argued that Afghanistan’s “ancient
name was Ariana; the oldest name of Afghanistan that lasted from 5,000 B.C until the
fifth century A.D.” In addition to Ariana that was Afghanistan’s ancient name, the
Afghan nationalists argued that “Afghanistan’s other historical name was Khurasan that
lasted from the fifth century A.D until the nineteenth century.”13 Crafting and inventing
history for Afghanistan and making the country an ancient place, which belonged always
to Afghans, were important activities of the Afghan nationalists and the state in order to
make a national history far older and historical than colonialism. As a matter of fact, the
Afghan nationalists and state preoccupied themselves throughout the period under study
here with the attempts to disregard politically and intellectually the fact that Afghanistan
was a colonial construct.
Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar (1897-1978), the foremost Afghan historian,
introduces his famous book afghanistan dar masir-e tarikh or Afghanistan in the Course
of History with the argument that it is a manufactured view to argue that Afghanistan is a
colonial construct. He wrote in the preface of the book “that the orientalists and their
imitators played with the history of nations of Asia and made it ardent toy of colonialism.
They defamed the historical facts and events with lies and fallacies and drew a slanderous
picture of them.” However, what was most important for Ghobar, to note here, was not

13

Ghobar (1987), 9
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the history of nations of Asia and elsewhere. He was concerned and preoccupied more
with the characterization, representation, and understanding of Afghanistan’s history. He
wrote that Afghanistan’s history was slandered by the orientalists who defined it as:
A new born country; created by the desires of the two imperial governments of
Russian Tsar and British Empire. This new born country, with thousands heterogeneous
tribes, tens of different languages and religious sects, has no history before the eighteenth
century. And…and…and. These kinds of colonial propaganda and fabrications, which
various books adopted them in depicting Afghans and Afghanistan’s history, especially
the British and later the western writers who took them as granted, and even also were
enacted in the official minds and writings of our Asian neighbors, became a fatal
epidemic disease.14

As it can be observed from Ghobar’s aggressive disregard of the idea that
colonialism constructed Afghanistan, the Afghan nationalists introduced Afghanistan as
an ancient country, and rejected the idea that Afghanistan was a colonial construct in
order to invent locally a national idea.
The Organization

This thesis has four chapters. Chapter one, Colonialism and Nationalism in
Afghanistan, will address nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of colonialism during
the nineteenth century. The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce how certain
colonial activities created the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan. Chapter
two, Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan, will review the historiography of nationalism
in Afghanistan. The goal is to explain how previous scholarly works have approached
and characterized the development of nationalism in Afghanistan. The core discussion of
the thesis is presented in chapter three, titled Reforms in Education. The intention in this
chapter is to discuss the relationship between nationalism in Afghanistan and education
between 1904 and 1929. Chapter four, Symbolizing Afghanistan, is about the symbols and
14

Ibid, 1-2
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ways, which were used by the Afghan state and the nationalists to project a national
identity inside and outside Afghanistan. At the end of this thesis, the section of
conclusion will summarize the findings of the research. The specific time frame for this
paper is 1901-1929.
Theorizing Nationalism

Because of flaws in its historical imagination, dissimilarities and contradictions in its
meaning and context, and ambiguities in its definition, it is assumed here that
‘nationalism’ is an idea, and nationalisms, like nationalism in Afghanistan, are modern
ideas.15 The idea of an Afghan nation, therefore, is a modern phenomenon. As a matter of
fact, the phrase “Afghan Nation” appears in the subtitle and table of contents of
Afghanistan’s first major colonial account, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul in
1842.16 There is no usage of such a phrase as “Afghan nation” before its appearance in
the Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, though Henry Vansittart and Sir William Jones,
the two British colonial officials who have written commentary articles on Afghans, use
in their writings the term “nation” to refer to Afghans. However, they do not have used
like the author of An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul the phrase Afghan nation. Also,
15

See Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), 5-9. Hechter talks about the difficulty of having one origin, one meaning, and one
definition for “nationalism.” He writes that it was Johann G. Herder, the eighteenth century
German thinker who first used the term “nationalism” in one of his texts. However, it has never
been given a clear definition to what nationalism is. Therefore, since then it has been an
ambiguous term, which has in turn motivated many writers, whose various definitions have
allowed them, to “offer quite different assessments of it,” 6.
16
This thesis’s author has not seen the first edition of An Account of the Kingdom of
Caubul which was published in 1815, and its second edition in 1839. So, whether those editions
had the phrase “Afghan Nation” in their subtitles and table of contents is not known to him. The
phrase, which the author, Mountstuart Elphinstone, of An Account of Kingdom of Caubul, spells
it, is “Afghaun Nation.” The Account and Elphinstone’s impact on nationalism in Afghanistan
will be fully discussed in the first chapter.

9

the first person to use intellectually the word ‘nationalism’ in reference to Afghanistan
was Hans Kohn (1891-1971).17 Kohn, a subject of Hapsburg Empire, historian, lawyer,
and an active Zionist,18 published apparently one of the first intellectual works on
nationalism, especially with specific reference to Asia. He commented on nationalism in
Afghanistan in his book, A History of Nationalism in the East (1929). Although he treated
collectively nationalism in Iran and Afghanistan under one title, “Changes in Persia and
Afghanistan” without an explanation to how they were alike and or different, his
argument was that “the Afghan tribes, warlike and barbarous, have always been animated
by a spirit of primitive nationalism and independence.”19 He suggested however that
“even-today the government, industries, and social institutions of Afghanistan are all
together medieval, as they were in Persia until quite recently. The spirit of rationalism,
and democracy, and capitalism [that are pre-conditions for existence of nationalism] has
hardly touched these countries and their populations.”20 However, beyond the primitive
and medieval character of nationalism in Afghanistan, what made nationalism in
Afghanistan really interesting for Kohn were the westernization and modernization
reforms of the Afghan ruler, Amanullah Khan (r.1919-1929). Under “Aman Ullah Khan,”

Hans Kohn, whose and several other nationalism theory pioneers’ works and analyses
were found biased, Eurocentric, and incomplete, wrote a seven page description of nationalism in
Afghanistan. For Kohn’s and other pioneers’ biased analyses of ‘nationalism theory,’ see
Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998), 16-18.
18
For biography of Kohn, his Zionist writings and activism, and works on nationalism,
see Leo Baeck Institute Collections at the Center for Jewish History, “Hans Kohn Collection,
Papers of Hans Kohn,” Identification Number AR 259/MF 493,
http://findingaids.cjh.org/?pID=121445 and
http://www.cjh.org/p/93?action=searchPartners&partner=3 (accessed 12, Jan, 2012).
19
Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1929, 341
20
Ibid, 319
17
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wrote Kohn, “a period of reforms imposed from above began in Afghanistan, similar to
what Peter the Great attempted in Russia and the Turks in their country.”21
However, Kohn’s explanation of nationalism was classical. According to the new
studies of nationalism, classical theories and explanations of nationalism were incomplete
and biased because many of them were first of all Eurocentric, and second of all they did
not have in consideration a lot of the changes in the studies of postcolonized societies
whose nationalisms needed new kinds of analysis. Therefore, this thesis uses a
postcolonial, modernist, and post-modernist approach to its analysis of nationalism in
Afghanistan. The approach is adopted from the works of three nationalism theorists: John
Breuilly 1994, Benedict Anderson 1991, and Anthony Smith 1998.
In contrast to the primordial and perennial theories of nationalism, the modernist and
post-modernist theory of nationalism argues that nationalism and nation are modern
concepts.22 However, the primordialists of nationalism theory argue that nations always
existed naturally in the past. The task of a nationalist at the present is to “remind his or
her compatriots of their glorious past, so that they can recreate and relive those glories.”23
Like primordialists but also different from them, the perennialists of nationalism theory
argue that nationalism has a perennial character: “nations and ethnic communities are

21

Ibid, 342. Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929) is the key personality in this thesis along
with a number of other individuals. He and his works will be discussed in all of the five chapters:
especially 3 and 4.
22
For a comprehensive survey of modernist theory of nationalism see Smith (1998),
especially chapters 1 through 6.
23
Anthony D. Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The role of nationalism in the
reconstruction of nations,” Nations and Nationalism, 1, no. 1 (1994), 18.
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cognate, even identical phenomena.”24 What distinguishes primordialism from the
perennialism theory of nationalism is that the former sees nations naturally born and
insists on the natural difference of one nation from another while the latter does not see
nations as naturally born.25
However, Breuilly (1994) and Smith (1998), the two modernist and post-modernist
theorists of nationalism, reject the assumptions that nations and nationalisms always
existed in the history. “Those historians who claim that a national consciousness existed
in medieval Europe or that there were patriots active in the sixteen century,” Breuilly
writes, “their claims should not be labeled as nationalism.”26 Like Breuilly, Smith also
suggests that “before the modern epoch, nations were largely unknown, and human
beings had a multiplicity of collective loyalties.” 27 A person had to be loyal to his or her
religious community or to a city or an empire or a monarch. In addition to the view that
modern nation-states did not always exist, the post-modernist theories of nationalism
argue that “the outlook of most human beings was strictly local” before the emergence of
the modern nation-states. Therefore, the modernist and post-modernist theory of
nationalism suggests that nation is a modern phenomenon, and its creation goes to the
emerging high culture of the industrial societies. The high culture is the situation that in
order to be a nation, the people of a certain territory need to have access to mass public
education system as this kind of system was becoming popular and increasing with the

24

See Smith (1998), chapter seven, pages 146-169 where he discusses the theories, and
problems of primordialism and perennialism nationalisms.
25
Ibid, 159.
26
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), 3.
27
Smith (1998), 146.
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emergence of the modern nation-states. The high culture then has had “certain kind of
literate which could only be forged and sustained by exo-socialisation.” Exo-socialisation
was the idea that modern nation-states unlike the pre-modern societies have had a new
kind of public education that had a standardized national curriculum. 28
This post-modernist explanation of nationalism is a departure from the classical and
romantic assumption that a people could be a nation if they had a common language.
Germany and France are, for instance, the two often examples that historians provide
when they describe the relationship between nationhood and common language. The
classical and romantic explanations of these two countries are that France and Germany
achieved a sense of nationhood because Germans and French were able to unite
themselves around a common language. For example, Labbe (2007) argues that the
Prussian state in the nineteenth century tried to make a German nation by
institutionalizing German language in schools and churches. The schools and churches
were registering a person according to his or her mother tongue.29 However, the
modernist and post-modernist theorists of nationalism do not share the views of the
classic theorists of nationalism. Today many people share a common language, though
they are not one nation. Americans and Brits speak, for example, English while they form
two different nationalities.
Because of the above discussed problems of the primordialism and perennialism
theories of nationalism, and the comprehensiveness of a grand narrative and all28

Ibid, 29-41
See also Boyd C. Shafer’s Nationalism: Myth and Reality, (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, 1955). Shafer’s work is a classic explanation of nationalism that emphasizes the role of
linguistic commonality in the creation of nations. Shafer, for example, argues that France and
Germany were able to becoming nations because each had a common language.
29

13

encompassing analysis of the modernist and post-modernist approach, this thesis has
found no data or evidence to prove that the modern nation of Afghanistan has always
existed in the past, and or it was given in nature. Therefore, applying the post-modernist
theories of nationalism, this thesis does not assume that there was always a country,
“Afghanistan,” in the history. In fact, Afghanistan as it is now known has been a modern
polity that was constructed by colonialism in the long nineteen century, 1808-1919. Only
after 1901 did an identity in the modern sense of the word such as “Afghan” began to be
imagined. This was as a result of several sociopolitical developments such as the
establishment of a new kind of education and emergence of a small roshanfekran or the
elite class in Kabul. For example, in 1923 when the Afghan nationalists designed the
country’s first national constitution, they homogenized the diverse ethnic identity in the
country where they now emphasized a homogenous national identity as “Afghan” over
ethnic identities such as “Pashtun” or “Tajik” or “Sunni” or “Shia” and or “Hindu.”
Everybody who was residing in Afghanistan was “imagined” as Afghan without regards
to their religious beliefs and affiliations and ethnic identities 30
In here, the concept of “imagined” is used from Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities (1991). Anderson suggests that nationalism is imagined because nationals
of a country, whether representing a big or a small nation, will never know or meet or
hear each other. What this mean is that it would be impossible for a national of a country,
say an Afghan, to know or meet every single countryman or countrywoman in his or her
nation, though they would still imagine a shared community, the nation. In addition to the

30

Government of Afghanistan (1923), 5
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imagination of nationalism, Anderson suggests that nationalism is “limited” because
there are several competing nationalisms in the world such as nationalism in Afghanistan
and nationalism in Iran or nationalism in India and nationalism in China. Therefore,
according to Anderson, nationalism is inherently limited to a particular nation. Last but
not least, Anderson also suggests that nationalism is “sovereign” because its creation is
new in the human history. It originated when the nation-states and the tools of the high
culture such as “print-capitalism” or newspapers and public spaces began to appear,
which then replaced previous forms of legitimacy and loyalty such as the divine-authority
and or the church.31 In Afghanistan too, individuals such as emir Amanullah Khan and
the Afghan nationalists such as Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), Mir Ghulam M. Ghobar,
Ghulam Muhyiuddin Anis (died, 1938), and Abdul Hai Habibi (1910-1984) “imagined” a
nation of Afghanistan and propagated it in the early twentieth century.
To conceptualize this imagination and propagation of a national idea and nationhood,
the four chapters below will address the following queries: how the modern nation of
Afghanistan came about; where to locate the origins of nationalism in Afghanistan; who
played significant roles in its creation; and how did the Afghan nationalists imagine
Afghan nation in the period between 1901 and 1929.

31

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, (New York: Verso, 1991), 6-7.

Chapter One: Colonialism and Nationalism in Afghanistan
We are at a point in our work when we can no longer ignore empires and the
imperial context in our studies.
Edward Said, 199332

The Origins of Nationalism in Afghanistan: Empire, Colonial Knowledge

What brought about the modern nation of Afghanistan is not a selective question
because it is a necessary and appropriate one if one wants to study nationalism in
Afghanistan. Ernest Renan (1823-1892), the French writer, titled his widely renowned
essay with a question, “What is a Nation?” His answer was that the modern nation is a
“historical result that is brought about by a series of convergent facts.” Its creation is
sometime the work of particular individuals, sometime due to the existence of a direct
will among its creators, and sometime because of the formation of a general
consciousness of its participants.33 The origins of the modern nation of Afghanistan also
involve a series of convergent facts, which are to be found in the annals of the nineteenth
and early twentieth century Afghanistan.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are crucial periods for studies of nationalism,
especially for nationalisms of the colonized societies. These two centuries witnessed the
rise and fall of the great multinational states. Empires were built and ruined by
nationalisms; the French, British, German, Japanese, Russian, and others including the
imperial and un-imperial nations of Americas. New nations were founded and
disintegrated by local and global nationalisms. Because nationalism became also a

32

Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 6.
Ernest Renan, Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 45. Renan mentions that Kings of France played important role
in bringing about the modern nation of France while because of the existence of a will among the
various linguistic and ethnic provinces, Switzerland and Belgium became nations. In the case of
Germany and Italy, Renan mentions, it was more a general consciousness than the role of kings or
will among Germans and Italians.
33

16

fanciest and racist ideology, and produced atrocities, it was soon to be condemned by
serious academic works and individuals later in the twentieth century due to its flaws and
violent as well as authoritarian character and history. It was for these flaws that some
have characterized nationalism as defining an invented phenomenon and an imagined
community. Such observations are notwithstanding, nationalism still remains a popular
topic that attracts the attention of scholars who seek to examine the role that nationalism
had played in the making and unmaking of empires and nations in these two centuries.34
Take for example the role that the British Empire or British nationalism played in its
confrontation with several nationalisms in the world during and after nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. These crucial incidents continue to play a role in the national
memories of various communities who experienced them. They happened from the
valleys, mountains, plains, and passes of Bamian, Charikar, Kabul, and Jalalabad in
Afghanistan to the plains of Punjab and shores of Persia as well as East Africa, South
Africa, West Africa, Jamaica, and China. For example, some of these incidents were but
not limited to the First Anglo-Ashanti War1823-1831; Opium Wars in China 1839-42;
First Anglo-Afghan War1838-1842; Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1880; Third
Anglo-Afghan War, 1919; 1840s wars against South African “Kaffirs”; New Zealand
Maoris War; Conquest of Punjab; the Crimean War 1854-6; Conquest of lower Burma
1854; Second China War 1856-60; Anglo-Persian War 1857; Suppression of Indian
Mutiny 1857; Governor Eyre Suppression of the Morant Bay Rebellion 1865; Decisive
Campaign against Ashantis 1874; Conquest of Egypt 1882; Partition of India and
34

Ibid, especially pages 3-37 where there is a useful provision of survey of studies of
nationalism.
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Palestine 1947; and creation of nations of Ghana and Kenya 1957 and 1963. As it seems
here, it is only a partial group of incidents that the British Empire had with various
nationalities and nations of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 35
Noting, therefore, the involvement and impact of empire and colonial activities on
creation and suppression of nationalisms in the world during the nineteenth and twentieth
century, it will become clear to notice how colonialism laid the very foundation of
nationalism in Afghanistan from 1808 to 1919. The imperial colonial activities of the
nineteenth century, both by the British and Russia, created the foundation of nationalism
in Afghanistan. These activities took several forms. They were in the forms of colonial
diplomatic treaties, overt and covert colonial missions, colonial conferences, colonial
wars, and colonial writings. They defined and territorialized the very name “Afghan” and
the territory that is now known as Afghanistan. All of them helped to construct the
colonial imagination and identification of Afghans as a wild tribal people and mapped
Afghanistan’s modern territorial boundaries. Take for example the following survey of
colonial activities in and about Afghanistan during the nineteenth century: Afghanistan’s
ten enthroned rulers of this period receive or allow entering into Afghanistan twelve
overtly known colonial diplomatic, spying, and commercial emissary missions.36 The

35

For a theoretical analysis of “empire,” these incidents, and nations, see Said (1993),

105-132.
36

These enthroned rulers—kings and emirs—were Shah Mahmud (r. 1800-1803, 18091817); Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk (r. 1803-1810, 1839-1842); Emir Dost Muhammad (r. 18261838, 1842-1863); Emir Shir Ali Khan (r. 1863-1866, 1868-1879); Emir Mohammad
Afzal (r. 1866-1867); Mohammad Azam Khan (r. 1867); Emir Mohammad Yaqub Khan
(r. February-October 1879); Emir Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901); Emir Habibullah
Khan (r. 1901-1919); and Emir/King Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929). For a
genealogical biography of these kings and emirs and their “claim” to the throne of
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purpose of each mission was to collect and produce information about Afghans as a
people and their territory as a polity, and bind them to the colonial conventions of
friendship, alliance, obligation, and do-business. These widely known missions were
Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission to the Kingdom of Caubul, 1808-1809; Alexander
Burns First Mission, 1831-4; Alexander Burns Second Mission to the Court of Dost
Mohammad Khan, Kabul 1837; Russian Mission to the Court of Dost Mohammad Khan,
1837; Alexander Burns Third Mission with the Army of Indus to Afghanistan, 18381841; Goldsmid Mission 1870-72; The Ottoman Mission to Afghanistan, 1877; Russian
Mission to Kabul, 1878; Sir Neville F. F. Chamberlain British Mission to the Court of
Shir Ali Khan, 1878; Sir Peter Lumsden Mission to Herat 1884; Dane Mission 1905; and
German-Ottoman Mission 1915. As a result of these twelve known and widely accepted
colonial missions between the years 1808 and 1915, Afghanistan was placed practically
and systemically in the orbits of the nineteenth century imperial-colonial apparatuses
where the people and its territories were literally defined and imagined by the colonial
officials who wrote about and characterized the history of Afghanistan, the culture of
Afghanistan, and the territory of Afghanistan. They wrote who an Afghan was and was
not. They decided where Afghanistan’s boundaries could and could not be. For instance,
Elphinstone in his An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul established the very parameter
of Afghanistan. He designated that “Afghaunistaun” was the area that was inhabited by
the Pashtuns and Pashtuns were the real Afghans, and their kingdom was “the kingdom
of Caubul.” He instead designated places and other ethnic groups such as “Bulkh” or
Afghanistan, see Ludwig Adamec, Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions, and
Insurgencies (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2005), 240, 347, 353, 85, 254, 255, 391, 6, and 147.
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Balkh or “Uzbeks” as “dependencies” of Afghanistan not part of Afghanistan and
Afghans.37
In addition to the twelve overtly known colonial missions to Afghanistan,
Afghanistan’s ten enthroned rulers sign nearly thirteen binding treaties with colonial
powers, mainly with the British Empire and or its patronized commercial enterprise, the
British East India Company. The treaties, which determined the fate of boundaries of
Afghanistan, its political sovereignty, and commercial flows of goods and services, made
Afghanistan a client state of the colonial powers.38
Beside the twelve colonial missions, thirteen Afghan-Colonial Powers Treaties, and
five inter-colonial powers treaties, Afghanistan’s rulers or its emissaries attended and or
were uninvited to five major colonial diplomatic conferences that were held to address

37

Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies,
in Persia, Tartary, and India; Comprising a View of the Afghaun Nation and a History of the
Dooraunee Monarchy ( London: Richard Bentley, 1842), 181
38
Tripartite Treaty 1838, Ranjit Sing, the Sikh ruler of Punjab, Shah Shuja, the exiled
ruler of Afghanistan, and British East India Company; Anglo-Shah Kamran Treaty of Herat 1839;
(Gregorian, p. 100); Anglo-Afghan Peace Treaties, called also Treaties of Peshawar, 1855 and
1857 (p. 103-104 coz 1857); Anglo-Afghan Agreement 1869 (p. 106); Treaty of Gandamak 1879;
Durand Agreement 1893 (Adamec p. 86-7 and 399-408); Anglo-Afghan Agreement 1905
(Adamec p. 463); Afghan-German Treaty of Friendship 1916 (Adamec p. 178-82); Anglo-Afghan
Treaty 1919, also known as Rawalpindi Treaty; Anglo-Afghan Friendship and Commercial
Treaty 1921 (Adamec p. 183); Treaty of Friendship Soviet-Afghan 192. It is useful to note that
these thirteen colonial treaties were only between Afghanistan and each colonial power. At least
five inter-colonial treaties were enacted among the colonial powers themselves, which affected
Afghanistan but Afghanistan’s consent was either ignored or rejected. These were Treaty of
Finkenstein 1807, Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1809, and Treaty of Tehran 1814 (British bound
Persians to attack on Afghanistan in case Afghans make troubles in India); Russo-Persian
Treaties of Gulistan 1813, and Treaty of Turkmanchai 1828. Shah Mahmoud Hanifi’s
Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation in a Colonial
Frontier, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) is an excellent read on how British
colonialism in South Asia and beyond made Afghanistan in the nineteenth century from an
independent self-sustainable polity into a dependent, colonially-client, and intellectually-defined
polity.
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the political and territorial status of Afghanistan in the second half of the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. The conferences were the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 18691873, Ambala Conference of 1872, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Mussoorie
Conference of 1920, and Kabul Conference of 1921.
The Russo-Anglo negotiations of the late nineteenth century on Afghanistan was of
particular interest here as an intercontinental negotiations that the European imperial
powers had in order to address the so-called “Eastern Question.” Ottoman Empire was in
decline and to protect and expand their imperial interests in the Ottoman held dominions
such as in Egypt and in the Balkans and Asia Minor, the imperial powers of Europe had
to enter into some sort of negotiations in order to prevent a total intercontinental war. For
example, Russia was already gaining new territories and influences in the Balkans,
Caucasus, and Central Asia. In 1873, the Khanate of Khiva, to the north of Afghanistan,
was captured by the Russians; five years later in 1878, this Russian advance in Central
Asia triggered the British to instigate a second invasion of Afghanistan, known as the
Second Anglo-Afghan War. To protect India, British entered into negotiations with the
Russia. Although the negotiations of 1869-1873 failed to stop Russia from expanding its
imperial holdings in Central Asia, the negotiations resulted in assurances from the
Russians to the British—not to the Afghans—that both imperial powers will recognize
the British interest and “sphere of influence” in and over Afghanistan. In addition,
Imperial Russia agreed with the British that they would recognize the Afghan emir Shir
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Ali Khan’s claims over Afghanistan’s northern and northeastern boundaries.39 Like the
first major colonial conference of 1869-1873 where Afghanistan was mapped to become
a “nation,” the other four colonial conferences of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century completed the construction of modern nation of Afghanistan, at least territorially.
The impact of the twelve colonial missions to Afghanistan, the thirteen AfghanColonial powers treaties, five inter-colonial powers treaties, and five major colonial and
inter-colonial conferences on the Afghan nation is obvious. Each of these colonial
missions, colonial treaties, colonial conferences, and colonial wars had everlasting impact
on nationalism in Afghanistan. While the very foundation of the idea of an Afghan
nation was constructed by these colonial activities, Afghan nationalists took it for granted
and made it into something local and un-colonial. The Afghan nationalists denied this
very historic reality that Afghanistan was a colonial construct. Afghan nationalists have
rejected the argument that colonialism was the maker of modern Afghan nation because
for them Afghanistan existed as a nation before the colonial era. This Afghanistan was,
for them, in reality a tarikhi-e Afghanistan or the ancient Afghanistan.
To analyze critically and understand better this transformation of nationalism in
Afghanistan from a colonial concept into a local idea, one of the twelve colonial
missions—the Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission to the Kingdom of Caubul 1808-1809—

39

For how the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 1869-1873 affected the territorial
boundaries of Afghanistan, and what role they played in creation of modern nation of
Afghanistan, see A. P. Thornton, Afghanistan in Anglo-Russian Diplomacy, 1869-1873 (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1955).
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will be examined thoroughly here to shed light on the role and power of colonial
knowledge in construction of nationalism in Afghanistan40
Mountstuart Elphinstone: Baba-ye Afghan, the Father of Afghans Invented

Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779-1859), the Scottish-born colonial official of the
British East India Company, has continuously remained the main architect and the high
authority of Afghan knowledge since 1815 when his book An Account of the Kingdom of
Caubul was first published.41 Elphinstone is important not only because he was the first
European colonial official to visit an Afghan ruler, Shah Shuja (r. 1803-1810, 1839-1842)
and secured an eternal friendship treaty from him to the British Empire. He also
organized, simplified, and standardized what is now known of Afghans, as a people, and
Afghanistan, as a country.42 To critically understand Elphinstone’s role in the
construction of colonial imagination of Afghans and assess how much intellectually
important he was in establishing the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan, it is
necessary to analyze his An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul rather his mission to the
court of Afghan ruler.
Although Elphinstone was the first colonial official who visited an Afghan ruler and
secured from him the first pact that an Afghan monarch signed with a European colonial
40

Elphinstone Mission is chosen here because it provides a useful framework of analysis,
which can help the reader to understand broadly while notice specifically the complexity of
“empire,” its intellectual power, and impact on the formation of nationalism in Afghanistan.
41
See Shah Mahmoud Hanifi’s 2012c, “Quandaries of the Afghan Nation,” in Under the
Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands, Shahzad Bashir and Robert D.
Crews, eds. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (expected spring 2012), about the
importance of Mountstuart Elphinstone’s An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul for the
construction of Afghan nation. Also see Hopkins (2008), especially pages 13-33 where he talks
about the very important role that Elphinstone played in definition and characterization of Afghan
nation.
42
Hanifi’s 2011 and 2012a-c.
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power, the British East India Company, he was not the first colonial official to establish
correspondences with Afghans’ rulers, and write about Afghans. The first written
colonial contacts took place between the British colonial state in India and Ahmad Shah
Abdali/Durrani (r. 1747-1773), the so-called baba-ye Afghan or the father of Afghans
during the years 1760-1761. In the pre-Elphinstone colonial contacts with Afghans,
Henry Vansittart, a colonial officer of the British East India Company, and Sir William
Jones (the famous orientalist and founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal who also
authored the theory of the Indo-European Language Family), were instrumental in
producing the early colonial imagination of Afghans.43 Vansittart and Jones both studied
and commented on history and genealogy of Afghans. For example, they examined
philologically Pashto language, one of the major languages of Afghans, in relation to the
other Indo-European languages.
They made two major inventions about Afghans that later played important role on
nationalism in Afghanistan and resonate even today with the public and official minds
both inside and outside Afghanistan. One invention, which later captured the attention
and entered into the writings of several colonial officials, was that the Afghans were one
of the ten lost tribes of Israel. Although the Jewish Descent Theory of Afghans did not
receive much support from the Afghan nationalists, it became part of the Afghan and
43

The Indo-European idea, by Sir William Jones, basically argued that communities such
as Indians, Persians, and Europeans have all the same ancestral lineage. He compared
philologically the languages of Europe and Sanskrit as well as Persian, and drew a conclusion: all
these languages had a common lost ancestor. The premise that Jones established was that since
the languages of Europeans, Indians, and Persians were the same, they were also genealogically
one people of the same lost ancestor. For a review of Jones’ theory and its impact on the colonial
construction of history of India, and “Indians” and other related communities in South Asia, see
Thomas R. Trautman, The lives of Sir William Jones. Sir William Jones, 1746-1794: a
commemoration, ed. by Alexander Murray, 93-121 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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outsider’s minds, at least.44 However, it was the second colonial invention that Jones
made of and for Afghans, which later impressed Afghan nationalists who took it as fact
and adopted it locally and propagated it in the official and un-official institutions of the
state power. This was the view that Afghans were Aryans and Afghanistan was the real
main homeland of Aryans, who then spread across the world.45 These pre-Elphinstone
colonial imaginations of Afghans are important but they did not carry substantial and
widespread consequences.
It is Elphinstone’s An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul that most fully structured
the colonial imagination of Afghans—an imagination that Afghan nationalists redocumented and re-enshrined in the idea of Afghanistan.46 The most important thing that
Elphinstone did was that he defined “Afghans” and Afghanistan.47 In other words, he
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See Ali Khan, Mohammad, History & Geography of Afghanistan (Lahore: Matb-e
Mufid Amman, 1927). This was a secondary education textbook in which the author talks about
Afghans being the descendants of Jews. One reason, that the Jewish Descent Theory did not
really impress Afghan nationalists, was perhaps because of Afghanistan’s Islamic heritage.
45
For Henry Vansittart and Jones’s construction of Afghans Jewish Descent Theory and
Aryan Theory, see Shah Mahmoud Hanifi’s 2012a, c, and d.
46
This re-documentation and re-enshrining of Elphinstone’s characterization on Afghans will be
shown in chapter 2, 3, and 4.
47
Elphinstone by Afghans meant the Pashtuns/Pathans who lived (and live)
predominately in the areas what are now known as Afghanistan (mostly, its eastern and southern
parts) and northern India (in particular, the North Western Frontier Province, as it was named by
the British Raj). The terminologies of “Afghan,” “Pashtun,” and “Pathan” are problematic. This
problem is because of the historical problem of identification of various ethnic communities in
Afghanistan. Supposedly, “Afghans” means “Pashtuns,” who are the “largest” ethno-linguistic
group in Afghanistan. They speak Pashto, which is different from Persian, Uzbeki, Nuristani,
Pashahi, and other languages of Afghanistan. Each of these latter languages has its own ethnic
community. The Persian speakers, who are estimated to be the second largest ethnic group in
Afghanistan, are known as Tajiks or Farsiwans. However, this identification of Tajiks or
Farsiwans is also problematic because several other ethnic communities also speak Persian as
their mother tongues: for example, the Hazaras or Aimaq peoples who are of their own ethnic
communities. Apart from this complexity of different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the
terminology “Afghan” or “Pashtun” is problematic in itself. Because a “Pashtun,” who is an
ethno-linguistic community and inhabit a large part of Afghanistan and Pakistan, can be all of the
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explained who Afghans were and were not. His account is full of descriptions of
Afghans’ characteristics, religion, society, culture, politics, and so on. He also discussed
the Afghan government, provinces, mountains, and anything else colonial officials
needed to know about the people of Afghanistan and their homeland. He even labeled the
tribes and categorized them. For instance, he differentiated between the tribes with
territorial boundaries and the tribes without. “Naussers” were introduced as a tribe that
had no territories like “Eusofzyes,” and they had a “wandering life.”48
Although everything that Elphinstone documented in his Account of the Kingdom of
Caubul about Afghans has in one or another way a place in understanding nationalism in
Afghanistan, his characterization of Afghans as a people will shed light here about how
much significant his impact was on the very knowledge that people now have of Afghans
and Afghanistan. He characterizes individually and collectively all of the various peoples
of the country. But, what becomes interesting and questionable is how he takes samples
and characterizes Afghans. For instance, he writes that he was characterizing “all of the
manner and characters of Afghauns,” by describing the characters of the “Eastern
tribes—the Berdooraunees,” and from among them, “Eusofzyes” who “display many of

three: “Afghan,” “Pashtun,” and “Pathan.” However, an “Afghan,” who lives currently in
Afghanistan, does not want to be called and is not referred to as “Pathan” because “Pathan” is an
ethno-linguistic community, whose ancestors are identified as “Pashtuns,” and they are spread all
across South Asia; mostly in India and Pakistan, and there is not such a community as “Pathan” in
Afghanistan. A Pashtun can be a “Pathan,” an “Afghan,” and a “Pashtun” while a “Pathan”
cannot be an “Afghan” and a “Pashtun.” This is because the Government of Afghanistan does not
recognize a “Pathan” community in Afghanistan. However, a “Pathan” can be a “Pashtun” but not
an “Afghan” in Pakistan. This is the real complexity of identifying who is and who is not an
“Afghan.” Nevertheless, for the sake of discussion in this paper, “Afghan” or “Afghans” mean
those people who are identified as “Afghan Nationals” who are now residing in the country what
is now known as Afghanistan. See Shah Mahmoud Hanifi’s 2012c.
48
Elphinstone (1842, Vol, 2), 174.

26

the peculiarities of their nation in more perfection than any other tribe.” “In
consequence,” Elphinstone continues, “we find the Berdooraunees brave, but
quarrelsome; active, industrious, and acute, but selfish, contentious, and dishonest. They
are more bigoted and intolerant than the other Afghauns, and more under the influence of
their Moollahs. They are also more vicious and debauched, and some among them are, in
all respects, the worst of the Afghauns.”49
These contrasting images of Afghans as people who were “brave, but quarrelsome;
active, industrious, and acute, but selfish, contentious, and dishonest,” drawn by the
power of colonial ink, continued in the official and public minds of both foreigners and
Afghans since Elphinstone published his An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul. For
example, Lowell Thomas, the American journalist who amazed the public and official
minds in imperial metropolises after World War One by photographing T. E. Lawrence
and transforming an ordinary British Colonial Army officer into a “Lawrence of Arabia,”
went to Afghanistan in 1920s. He continued in the style of Elphinstone by publishing an
account in which he exoticized Afghanistan and Afghans. In his Beyond Khyber Pass
into Forbidden Afghanistan (1925), he paraphrased Elphinstone’s characterization of
Afghans:
The Afridis, and in fact all Afghan-Pathan peoples, abhor stupidity,
indecision, and hair-splitting (except in theological controversy) and will follow
only a leader with courage and dash. Warm-hearted to those they love; they are
brutally cruel to their enemies. Impulsive to a fault, they will wait patiently for
years in order to get revenge. They are hospital, yet canny, and excessively
conceited, but feel a humble resignation to the will of Allah. They have also the
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Ibid, 1-2

27

germ of that spirit of travel and adventure that has made every great nation and is
the hope of the world. 50

Reading Lowell Thomas’s account and the narratives of other writers, both Afghans
and foreigners, one immediately recognizes the impact of Mountstuart Elphinstone
Mission (1808-1809) and his book An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul. It structured the
foundation of what now is known of Afghanistan. Elphinstone’s impact is nicely
summarized by one study as the following:
“Elphinstone’s conceptual episteme did not simply frame subsequent understandings
of Afghan society as tribal. It also narrowed ideas of what constitutes legitimate political
order and community in Afghanistan. This narrowing exerted a formative effect over
both colonial policy and colonial knowledge, and it continues to influence international
efforts in Afghanistan today. Once the space occupied by the Afghans had been cognized
in terms of the Elphinstone episteme, the colonial state began to contour that space with
political expectations. Having constructed the Afghan political entity as essentially South
Asian in character, the Company, and later the Crown, expected the Afghans to act like
other political entities with which they interacted in the subcontinent.” 51

As Elphinstone showed that empire and colonial knowledge had something to do with
nationalism in Afghanistan, it was not only Elphinstone as a colonial official who defined
and characterized Afghans and their homeland, Afghanistan. It was “a series of the
convergent facts” as Ernest Renan indicated that could result in creation of a nation. This
was true of nationalism in Afghanistan’s colonial legacy, which had these series of
convergent facts in its trajectory.
Indeed, when Elphinstone was traveling through the plains and valleys of northern
India all the way up to Peshawar looking for and after Afghans to ‘record’ for the British
colonial state in India in 1808, one of his Scottish fellowman, William Blackwood (177650

Lowell Thomas 1925, 39. It is useful to note that Thomas is not the only person who
imitated the views of Elphinstone.
51
Hopkins (2007), 23.
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1834), founded Edinburgh Encyclopedia in the same year to record Edinburgh, the capital
of the “Scottish Nation.”52 Late in the nineteenth century, exactly sixty-four years after
the first publication of An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, another Scottish colonial
officer, Major George Frederick Blackwood who was the grandson of William
Blackwood came to Kandahar, the capital of southern Afghanistan. Blackwood was badly
sick in 1879 when he heard that Sir Pierre Louis Cavagnari, the Italian-French born and a
British naturalized citizen and colonial officer had been killed in his Colonial Residency
in Kabul in September 3rd, 1879.
Although Major Blackwood was still sick in India, he could not accept the possibility
that the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) might become another lost battle for the
British Empire similar to the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842). Consequently, Major
Blackwood left India to Afghanistan to avenge the killing of Cavagnari, the British
Envoy in Kabul. When he arrived in Kandahar, he was one of the several colonial
officers to assist Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), the celebrated “Iron Amir,” the
state-builder, and unifier of the modern nation of Afghan nation and a British subsidized
ruler. Major Blackwood wanted to keep in power Rahman’s appointed governor, Wali
Shir Ali Khan in Kandahar, and take revenge of the killing of Cavagnari. However, in
July 27 of 1880 Major Blackwood was also killed in the Battle of Maiwand, the most
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The author has learned about the Scottish Nationalism and William Blackwood and his
publishing and printing activities in Scotland, from several conversations with Brian Duncan, a
graduate fellow in the history department at James Madison University. For more specifically on
Blackwood, see "William Blackwood (Scottish publisher) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia."
Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/68653/William-Blackwood (accessed February 14,
2012).
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memorable battle that Afghan nationalists would recall from their experiences with the
British colonialism in Afghanistan. 53
As Elphinstone established the Afghan figure “Ahmed Shauh,” the founder of
Afghanistan,54 so did Major George Frederick Blackwood death in the Battle of Maiwand
in turn create another Afghan figure, Malalai—this time the female Afghan figure of
nationalism in Afghanistan. As part of the colonial-nationalism narrative in Afghanistan,
the story goes that Malali, who is locally known as da Maiwand Malalai or Malalai of
Maiwand, along with her father and fiancé participated in the Battle of Maiwand, which
occurred during her wedding day. She was then martyred in the battle. In the annals of
the battle when it was turning in favor of the British, it has been written that Malalai
shouted:
"Young love! If you do not fall in the battle of Maiwand, by God,
someone is saving you as a symbol of shame!"
"With a drop of my sweetheart's blood, shed in defense of the
Motherland, Will I put a beauty spot on my forehead, such as would put to
shame the rose in the garden."55
This call, the story goes, from an “Afghan woman” upon the Afghan men who were
supposedly losing the Battle of Maiwand to the British turns the battle in favor of Afghan

For Major George Frederick Blackwood’s biography and his participation in the
Maiwand Battle, see Sir Leslie Stephen, and Sir Sidney Lee, "Dictionary of national biography Sir Leslie Stephen, Sir Sidney Lee - Google Books." Google Books.
http://books.google.com/books/about/Dictionary_of_national_biography.html?id=DdgpAAAAY
AAJ (accessed February 11, 2012). For Cavagnari, Maiwand Battle, and Second Anglo-Afghan
War, see Garen Ewing, "The Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1880: The British in Afghanistan."
The Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1880: The British in Afghanistan.
http://www.angloafghanwar.info (accessed February 11, 2012).
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For an English piece on Malalai, see Garen Ewing, "Malalai -Afghan heroine of
Maiwand." http://www.garenewing.co.uk/angloafghanwar/biography/malalai.php (accessed
February 11, 2012).
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and results in a victory for Afghanistan. Malalai, who is the heroine of the Battle of
Maiwand, provided nationalism in Afghanistan with the imagined, real, and mythical
realities that all nationalisms need to foster a sense of nationhood. Since Malalai’s
participation in the Battle of Maiwand and identification of her as a female figure of
nationalism in Afghanistan have become part of the popular and local narrative in the
country, she is now honored throughout Afghanistan by naming after her Malalai High
School, Malalai Hospital, and Malalai Magazine. In addition to these institutions,
thousands Afghan parents have named (and continue to name) 56 their daughters as
“Malalai” after Malalai of Maiwand.
The end of the Battle of Maiwand and the construction of Malalai as Afghanistan’s
nationalist icon commenced the twentieth century. By this time, Elphinstone’s An
Account of the Kingdom of Caubul was already more useful and more necessary than ever
for Afghan nationalists. They were ready to use any sources, no matter Elphinstonian
knowledge and or its locally adopted and modified forms to imagine Afghanistan.
Exactly one hundred eighteen years after Elphinstone published his An Account of the
Kingdom of Caubul where he designated ‘Ahmed Shauh’ the founder of modern
Afghanistan, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, one of the prominent Afghan nationalists
of the era agreed with Elphinstone’s designation of Ahmad Shah as the founder of
Afghanistan. However, what Ghobar did different from Elphinstone was that he did not
only designate Ahmad Shah as the founder of modern Afghanistan, but he also
designated him as Ahmad Shah Baba-ye Afghan or Ahmad Shah the Father of Afghans.
56

It is useful to note here that the current internationally and U.S backed-president of
Afghanistan Hamid Karzai named Malalai his second child, a daughter, who was recently born in
March 15, 2012.

Chapter Two, Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan
In addition to the theoretical and contextual problems associated with the study of
nationalism in Afghanistan, there is also the issue of scarcity of scholarship on the
subject. The associated problem is the fact that the Euro-American scholars of the
country have not demonstrated dissimilarity in their approach and argument. There is no
difference of opinion about and of nationalism in Afghanistan among them. They have
collectively identified the tenets of nationalism in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929 in
a hegemonic way and they have labeled this period as an era of “reform and rebellion” in
Afghanistan. Considering the number of studies that are produced about nationalism in
Afghanistan and their hegemonic treatment of nationalism in Afghanistan through one
kind of narrative, one kind of tale, and one kind of description, it is safe here to review
them also monolithically rather than individually.57
In here, the review of studies of nationalism in Afghanistan introduces certain
personalities of nationalism, certain events of nationalism, and the general characteristic
of nationalism in Afghanistan. The metaphor that would guide the discussion in this
chapter is called “A Hegemonic Narrative of Nationalism in Afghanistan.” This narrative
is woven around individual nationalists and their time:
Habibullah Khan, r. 1901-1919

The narrative, which the previous studies have told of nationalism in Afghanistan,
starts with “great men” and “hegemonic institutions” such as Emir Habibullah Khan (r.
57

The major scholarly works, which have characterized the era, 1901-1933 as a period of
“reform and rebellion,” and have offered a monolithic explanation of nationalism in Afghanistan
and reforms, are Kohn (1928, half-chapter), Wild (1933, a book); Dupree (1964, an article);
Gregorian (1967, an article and later developed into a book);Ghobar (1987, two and half chapter);
Poullada (1973, a book); Schinasi (1979, a book); Nawid (1999, 2009 a book and an article); and
Sakhavarz (2007, a book). These works are standard sources for studying nationalism in
Afghanistan.
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1901-1919) and Habibya College.58 Although Habibullah Khan or Siraj al-Millat wa’Din,
the Torch of Nation and Religion, was born in Samarqand (then a colonized Central
Asian Khanate of the Russian Empire where his father Abdur Rahman was living), he as
the Crown Prince of Afghanistan inherited the throne in 1901 when Rahman died. His
father, who ruled Afghanistan with coercion and cruelty for twenty one years, 1880-1901,
left for him a colonially established state with a territorially unified polity. As he began
his rule, the British Colonial State in India also continued bankrolling him, as the heir of
the Afghan throne. This patronage was in recognition of the fact that his father, Rahman,
was the signatory of several treaties with the British. The British continued to grant
subsidy in return for recognizing British to control and protect Afghanistan’s foreign
relations.59
However, what becomes important to the development of nationalism in Afghanistan,
as the narrative tells, is that Habibullah was different from his father. This difference was
seen in many actions and activities of Habibullah while he ruled Afghanistan. He was a
man of modern ideas and modern ways of running a state and a country. He was, as one
study of nationalism in Afghanistan wrote, a person with an “enterprising nature …
[and]…curious about technology and mechanics.”60 For instance, he was not shy to be
photographed; a new fashion of identification that became more popular among the elites
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Habibya College is the subject of discussion in chapter three.
For a discussion of British’s subsidy to Abdur Rahman, see Shah. M. Hanifi,
“Impoverishing a Colonial Frontier: Cash, Credit, and Debt in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan,”
Iranian Studies, 37, no. 2 (2004), 199-218
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May Schinasi, Afghanistan at the beginning of the twentieth century: nationalism and
journalism in Afghanistan: a study of Seraj ul-akhbar, 1911-1918), (Naples: Istituto universitario
orientale (1979), 29. However, it is important to note here that Habibullah’s father, Rahman, was
also interested in technology and mechanics. It was Rahman who introduced for example minting
machines and several other kinds of machineries in Afghanistan in 1890s.
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of Kabul in the early twentieth century.61 He also did not hesitate to introduce for the first
time motor cars (see the figure below) in Afghanistan. He even went to India to join
secretly a British Colonial Freemasonry in Calcutta, Lodge Concordia No. 3102; a
colonial club “with a small but exclusive membership, restricted to British Civil and
Military Officers of high standing.”62

See Siraj al-Akhbar 2nd Year, No. 1, where Siraj ul’Akhbar’s first photo publication is
an image of Habibullah Khan. It is useful to note here that in 1912, Habibullah Khan encouraged
a “Photography Competition,” the first in Afghanistan, where the princes of the Royal House took
part. In the competition, Prince Enyayatullah, Habibullah’s eldest son, won the best photo. His
picture was the “Entrance Gate of the Royal Garden House of Jalalabad,” the Eastern Province of
Afghanistan. See SA 2nd, No. 20, p. 12; and SA 2nd, No. 21, p. 11-12.
62
Although understood as rumors Habibullah’s freemasonry membership, he indeed
joined secretly the Lodge Concordia No. 3102 in Calcutta. One of the colonial officers, Henry
McMahon (then, the Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan), who was appointed in charge of
Habibullah’s visit to India in 1906, has documented that Habibullah “begged” for joining the
freemasonry. After several denials, he was made a freemason through colonial diplomacy. While
having an official dinner with the colonial Commander-in-Chief of India (Lord Kitchener) who
lobbied his membership into the Freemasonry, and approval by the Duke of Connaught, the
Grand Master of the lodge, Habibullah alone was driven to an emergent meeting of the Lodge on
February 2, 1907 at 9:45 p.m. Unable to speak English, the oath, ritual, and proceedings had to be
translated for him in Persian. Becoming a full member of the Lodge, he left the meeting at 12
p.m, and made a last wish; if he could establish Freemasonry in Afghanistan. For a full
description of how Habibullah became a freemason, and how this “Colonial Freemasonry
Diplomacy” became invaluable for the British during World War One in taking Habibullah’s
favor, see Henry McMahon, “An Account of the Entry of H. M. Habibullah Khan Amir of
Afghanistan Into Freemasonry.” (London: Favil, 1936).
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(Figure, 3)

The Perisan text beneath the image reads as following: “The car, which is the personal vehical of His
Majesty, Siraj ul’Millat Wa Din, is the best car among the Royal House’s cars. Engine 40 to 50 Power.
Speed, 60 Miles Per Hour.”63

However, what really made Habibullah different from his father, more so than the
introduction of motor cars and membership of the colonial freemasonry in India, was his
decision to offer political amnesty to the thousands Afghans who had been exiled by his
father. This amnesty, as conveyed by the hegemonic narrative of nationalism in
Afghanistan, made possible for Afghanistan to start experiencing modernization reforms
because of the return of the exiled Afghans. Since the exiled Afghans had spent times in
places such as Damascus, Cairo, Istanbul, and colonial cities of British India, they were
well aware with reforms and modernization efforts of the governments and nationalists in
those places. When Habibullah invited them to come to Afghanistan, they came back. But
when the exiled Afghans, chief among them Mahmud Tarzi’s family arrived and saw the
63
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backwardness of their fatherland, they raised questions about Afghanistan’s past
historical achievements in the Perso-Islamic world, its present-status of backwardness,
and raised questions about the solutions for its future: Chea bodeam (what were we);
Chea shodeam (what we became); and Aya Che Bayed Kard, (what ought to be done)?64
Aya Che Bayed Kard was the Persian title of a book (1912) that was written by Mahmud
Tarzi the so-called “father” of nationalism in Afghanistan.
Tarzi (1865-1933) was one of the exiled Afghans who returned to Afghanistan when
Habibullah issued the amnesty.65 Aya Che Bayed Kard is praised by the previous studies
of nationalism in Afghanistan because it shows the development of national
consciousness in Afghanistan and the attempts of Afghan nationalists to reforming the
country. Aya Che Bayed Kard’s main (and hegemonic) argument is that the advancement
of a country depends how much loyal the people of that country are to the ruler and the
state, and how much the ruler favors his people. According to Tarzi, it was possible for
Afghanistan to progress. However, there were certain ways to achieve progress in
Afghanistan. “To progress,” Tarzi suggests a hegemonic premise:
One way is that the ruler should favor reforms for [his] country, especially the rulers
of the Abode of Islam because a Muslim sees necessary the existence of a ruler. And he
obeys him, and sanctions himself in service of the ruler…..We [Afghans] are thankful for
the Almighty God who has favored the Afghan nation with a just ruler, Habibullah, Siraj
ul-Millat Wa Din. Another way to advancement and progress of a nation is through
education, which has been made possible by the Holiness, the Necessary Being,
Habibullah. 66
64

Mahmud Tarzi, Aya Che Bayad Kard: What ought to be Done? (Kabul, Matb-e Darul
Sultana, 1912), 2.
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He is an important figure to note of him in order to examine nationalism in
Afghanistan. The limited numbers of studies, which are produced on nationalism in Afghanistan,
place Mahmud Tarzi at the center of their analysis in discussing the modernization reforms and
development of nationalism in Afghanistan in the early decades of the twentieth century, are
Dupree (1964), Gregorian (1967), Schinasi (1979), Nawid (2009), and Sakhavarz (2007).
66
Tarzi (1912), 3-7.
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The exiled Afghans such as Tarzi, whose local and global modernist consciousness
was the result of their immigration, access to information, and interaction in the wider
world outside Afghanistan, became nationalist Afghans once they came back to their
fatherland. The hegemonic narrative of nationalism in Afghanistan tells that it were these
nationalist Afghans who began to help Habibullah to bring about a number of
modernization reforms in Afghanistan. For example, Habibya College, a modern school
with a new standard curriculum of education besides the religious education, was opened
in 1904.67 In 1911, the Afghan nationalists now led by Tarzi published Siraj ul-Akhbar
Afghaniya, “the Torch of Afghan News.” Publication of Siraj ul-Akhbar, as the first
modern newspaper in Afghanistan, promoted a nationalistic and modernist idea whose
writers and readers were Afghan elites in Afghanistan and pan-Islamic and pan-Asian
nationalists outside Afghanistan.68
However, before Siraj al-Akhbar, Afghanistan had also a newspaper that was called
Shams Al’Nahar or “the Sun of the Day” that was published supposedly between 1873
and 1877. Unlike Siraj Al-Akhbar, very little is known of Shams Al’Nahar—answers to
such basic questions as whose idea was it and where the printing presses were brought
from, and why it stopped publishing all elude the researcher. The current knowledge
about Shams Al-Nahar is all based on the 16 page copy that exists: its editor was Mirza
Abdul Ali who worked in the court of emir Shir Ali Khan. It was published in Persian.
Internal evidence from the available 16 pages of Shams al’Nahar indicates that its

Habibya College is the subject of analysis in chapter three, “Reforms in Education.”
See Schinasi (1974) for a discussion of Siraj al-Akhbar and the role of Mahmud Tarzi
in the development of nationalism in Afghanistan.
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sources of information were mostly newspapers of South Asia origins. The scripts would
be copied and reported. Some of the South Asian newspapers’ names that appear in
Shams al’Nahar are “Newspapers of Rajputana,” “Newspapers of Moradabad,”
“Newspapers of Lahore,” and “Newspapers of Punjab.”69 The world news appeared first
in the bulletin and the domestic news came in second. Some of the news reports were on
such topics as “an English man who divorces his old wife after meeting a girl, and
promises her marriage. However, after a while he does not marry her but remarries his
old wife. This creates a bad name for the girl. Now the courts have asked him to pay a
fine of 30,000 rupees to the father of the girl so that he can marry his daughter to
somebody else.”70 Some of the news headlines were reports Khabar az London or News
from London and News from America: the New World, which included stories about the
railway construction programs that were being undertaken in the United States. Other
news reports were on topics like new ways to know a child: “it has been reported from
China where they have found out a new way to know about legitimacy of a son. They
take some blood from a son, and some from a father, and put them in a cup or bowel. If
the bloods mix, it means that the son is the legitimate son of the father. Otherwise, if the
bloods don’t mix, there was no relationship between them.”71
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Shams al-Nahar (1873-1877), 6-16.
Ibid, 6-7.
71
Ibid, 7. The other major interesting news reports were: “News from Prussia: Gold
Robbery in Prussian State,” “the English Man Conversion into Islam in Lahore,” “the Muslim
Imam Conversation into Christianity in Delhi,” “News from Mecca,” and “News from Sultan of
Rum: his disputes with the Austria-Hungary Empire on the issue of jazya over the Sultan’s
Christian Subjects in Bosnia.” According to Shams ul-Nahar, there were also emphasis by the
Afghan court on the courtiers to learn English, Urdu, and Arabic. In addition, to the languages;
the studies of history, math, and geography were encouraged because they were bringing
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Although Shams al-Nahar was the first known newspaper of Afghanistan in the
nineteenth century and Siraj al-Akhbar started its publication in 1911, Afghanistan began
to have a growing culture of print-capitalism after the country was made independent in
1919. In the years after 1919, the Afghan nationalists or roshanfekran or the elites as they
were known and referred to themselves locally, had access to foreign magazines and
newspapers as well as several other domestic publications. For example, unlike the period
1901 until 1918 when there was only Siraj al-Akhbar, in the period between 1919 and
1929 there were at least thirteen major newspapers in the country. Every one of these
newspapers represented a region of the country: Southern, Eastern, Northern, Western,
and Central Afghanistan including the capital, Kabul. For example, Etehad-e Mashriqi,
‘eastern unity’ (1920), represented the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. In 1922, Etehade Khan Abad, ‘Khan Abad unity,’ was founded, representing northeastern region,
Qataghan Province. Bedari, ‘awakening,’ and Etehad-e Islami, ‘Islamic unity’ were
founded in the city of Mazar-e- Sharif in the northern region. Setar-e Afghan, ‘Afghan
star,’ was established in Charikar, the capital of Parwan Province in central Afghanistan.
In 1921, Tulu-e Afghan, ‘the rise of Afghan,’ started its publication in Kandahar city,
representing southern Afghanistan.72
All of these printing-publications show that the Afghan nationalists had more and
more access to new information such as the concepts of nationality or nationhood and
modernity that were made possible by what Benedict Anderson called print-capitalism.
Although Afghanistan’s printing-publications were not as many as its neighbor countries,
consciousness about “the maps and famous peoples of the world; kings of England, Persia,
Russia, and etc.” see Ibid, 5.
72
See Gregorian (1969), specifically page 245 for a list of these newspapers.
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such as British India, the Afghan roshanfekran or the elite class still had access to various
regional and global printing-publications that allowed them to read about new
information that was not only divine or theological but also secular and modern. For
example, Mir Ghulam Mohammad (1897-1978), who grew up and self-educated himself
during this period, writes that the Afghan roshanfekran were having access to foreign and
domestic publications that provided them with secular and modern information about the
“political, social, and economic affairs” of the world.
The roshanfekran class, according to Ghobar, composed of three kinds of people: the
liberals, the young Afghans, and individual roshanfeker or elite. The first two groups
were connected directly with the royal court where they were advocating for reforms
within the state. However, the difference between the liberals and the young Afghans, the
first two groups, was that the latter wanted to change the absolute monarchial regime into
a constitutionalist monarchy. The third group of roshanfekran who were outside the state
had independent personal relationships among themselves such as sharing information
about the state of affairs of Afghanistan and the world.73 What becomes interesting here
is to note that these small groups of elites had increasing access to print-publications from
both outside and inside Afghanistan, which was made possible by Afghanistan’s growing
and regional print-capitalism market.
During Habibullah Khan’s reign, the major printing source of information was Siraj
Al-Akbar, the main publication of Afghanistan that advocated a nationalistic and
modernist idea in Afghanistan. In this publication, the exiled Afghans including Mahmud
73

See Ghobar (1987), especially pages 716-727 where he talks more in detail about these
groups of Afghan roshanfekran.
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Tarzi who had returned to the country received strong support from Habibullah. He
patronized the newspaper and its editor, Tarzi, to publish on the sociopolitical state of
affairs of Afghanistan and the world.
However, the printing-publications soon became a problem for Habibullah who felt
threaten and thought that his monarchial power was challenged by the Afghan
nationalists who demanded faster and more reforms and changes in Afghanistan. In a way
nationalism gets entrenched with rising sentiments of the Afghan nationalists. It became
so in the sense that the Afghan nationalists, unlike Habibullah, wanted faster and more
changes in the state and status quo of Afghanistan. This was especially true for those who
disagreed with the internal and external policies of Habibullah Khan and demanded a
complete change, for example, in the Anglo-Afghan Relations. This group is popularly
characterized by the local Afghan historians as Mashruta’khwahan or the
constitutionalists. 74
Habibullah therefore felt suspicious and threatened by the Afghan nationalists who
were demanding faster and more changes in the state, its internal and foreign policy, and
above all, in the status quo of the country. The status quo of the country was related
particularly to Afghanistan’s foreign policy which was still controlled by the British.
When Habibullah refused to agree with the call for change and thereby demoralized the
ambitions of the emerging Afghan nationalists, he was assassinated in 1919 when he was
at a seasonal hunting trip in Laghman in Eastern Afghanistan.
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For a detailed discussion of the Afghan constitutionalists, see Habibullah Habibi,
Junbesh-e Mashruta’khwahan dar Afghanistan: The Constitutionalist Movement in Afghanistan
(Peshawar: Sazman-e Mahajeerin Musulman-e Afghanistan, 1999).
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There are several arguments with regards to Habibullah’s assassination. There is a
religious argument. There is the speculation that the Afghan religious elites, led by
Nasrullah Khan, Habibullah Khan’s brother, sponsored his assassination because he kept
Afghanistan neutral during World War One when the British were fighting the Islamic
Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire. How much convincing this argument is will be hard to
prove, though it is accepted and narrated by the major works on nationalism in
Afghanistan. 75 Another is the nationalism argument that purports that he was
assassinated by Afghan nationalists because he did not only stay neutral during World
War One but because he was still receiving subsidy from the British in exchange for
allowing them to control the foreign policies of Afghanistan.76 Whether Habibullah was
assassinated because of his neutrality in World War One or because of his agreement to
grant British control of Afghanistan’s foreign policies, the hegemonic narrative tells that
though Habibullah was the pioneer of modernization reforms that paved the way for
nationalism in Afghanistan, he was not too much nationalist. This is in the sense that he
did not bring enough change in the status quo of Afghanistan from a British controlled
backward polity to an independent modern polity.
Amanullah Khan, r. 1919-192977
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See for example Senzil Nawid, Religious response to social change in Afghanistan,
1919-29: King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 34-42;
and Gregorian (1967), 215-223.
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Schinasi (1979), 35-36.
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Amanullah Khan’s full name and title take various forms and spellings. They are all of
the followings: Amanullah Khan, Aman Ullah Khan, Aman-Allah, Aman Allah, emir Amanullah
Khan, emir Amanullah, Shah Amanullah, Shah Amanullah Khan, King Amanullah, King
Amanullah Khan, Ghazi Amanullah, Ghazi Amanullah Khan, and Shah Ghazi Amanullah Khan.
For the sake of consistency, this thesis will use “Amanullah Khan,” referring to the emir/king
Amanullah throughout the thesis.
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The hegemonic narrative picks up its tale of nationalism in Afghanistan by telling that
when Habibullah was killed in 1919, his son Amanullah Khan who may have played a
role in assassination of his father came to the throne after a short power struggle between
him and his uncle, Nasrullah Khan. What is useful to note here is that the hegemonic
narrative exoticizes and romanticizes Amanullah’s nationalism more than ever.
Amanullah is identified, for example, as the champion of nationalism in Afghanistan
because he did not want to only reform Afghanistan but he wanted to do it faster and
drastically. After his enthroning, Amanullah freed Afghanistan from British control in the
1919 War of Independence or known also as the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The freedom
and reforms of Afghanistan were inevitable when Amanullah was enthroned because he
was someone, as one study of him wrote:
[Whose] heart was bred with a burning flame of nationalism which was not to be
found in the heart of any other Afghans. He saw the flatters of other lands, and he
heard the soft arguments of many nationalities. He learnt how beneficial it would
be for Afghanistan to link her fortunes with the Germans and the Turks. He was
intent upon showing to the world that Afghanistan could not be regarded as the
pathetic little ‘buffer-state’ towards which the Great Powers could show a
benevolent tolerance.” 78

When Afghanistan was made free, he started to modernize it rapidly and drastically
because he was “the true Afghan.” It is argued by the hegemonic narrative that:
He knew the country better than most. He knew he had the personality to lead, and
to lead as far as dead. He had brain, and he was sea-green incorruptible. He was not
smug. But he was arrogant. He was now in the position to set in motion the ideals which
had born in his heart. In many moments of reverie, he thought of the backward condition
of his people. Even the tenets of the religion which were taken for granted in his country,
came up for review in his vigorous brain. The women, for instance; few dared to brave
the wrath of Allah and the temporal disapproval of the mullahs by thinking freely about
the purdah system. Few questioned the right of men to imprison women all their lives in
the enveloping clock of custom. But Amanullah did….Amanullah’s energy and ambitions
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Ronald Wild, Amanullah, Ex-King of Afghanistan (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1978), 25.
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were entirely guided by good intentions. [He was someone] that nothing swerved him
from his path of violent nationalism.79

The above passage is from Ronald Wild, a Scottish reporter for the Daily Telegraph
of London. Wild is the only person who has produced a useful and only biographical
account of Amanullah, Amanullah: Ex-King of Afghanistan (1933). Wild, like many other
Western journalists, was astonished to witness first-hand the modernist reforms of
Amanullah. In 1928 he went to Kabul to observe the reforms in person because he
wanted to know whether the media reports out of Afghanistan were true or an
exaggeration of the modernization programs of Amanullah. Wild finds Afghanistan still a
place “untouched by civilization… [where in its capital, Kabul]…all around were the
noisy dramas of Eastern buying and selling. In the actual thoroughfare, donkeys, and
mules and skeleton ponies struggled and bumped their way through. ‘Kabadar! Kabadar!’
yelled the men who tend them. ‘Make way, make way.’ And with a continued shouting
for room, obeyed by none, the merchandise of the entire East would pass.”80 Despite of
the backwardness of “this God-forsaken corner of a harsh and cruel land….[where]…the
so-called evils of modernity had never penetrated, and might never penetrate,” Wild’s
account of Amanullah like many studies of Afghanistan still draws a hegemonic and
romanticized picture of Amanullah, and praises him throughout his book for standing
against and modernizing a “savage land.”81
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Ibid, 23-46.
Ibid, 72. It is important to note here that Wild has anglicized wrongly the phrase
“Kabadar! Kabadar!;” Make Way, make way. The phrase is Khabardar! Khabardar!.
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Ibid, 19 and 131. It is helpful to note that Wild was not the only correspondent who
went to Afghanistan to observe and romanticize the reforms of Amanullah. Lowell Thomas, the
American journalist, and also several others such as Andree Viollis of the Paris daily, Le Petit
Parisien, went also during Amanullah’s reign, 1919-1929. Thomas is one of the most famous
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Although Amanullah is praised for his radical nationalism sentiments, the hegemonic
narrative concludes with the observation that Amanullah was ignorant and yet too radical
for the modernization program for Afghanistan. He could not understand the
conservatism and natural backwardness of his traditional society; therefore he failed in
his nationalistic reforms of Afghanistan. His failures were because he had a country,
Afghanistan, that was (and “is”) an inward-looking society that opposed progress and
reforms, which the true Afghan, Amanullah, envisioned for it.
According to the hegemonic narrative of nationalism in Afghanistan, Amanullah was
overthrown and exiled in 1929 following an uprising against his modernist progressive
reforms. There are two historiographical arguments that the studies of Afghanistan offer
in regards to the fall of Amanullah’s regime. One is the argument of the foreign scholars.
They argue that since Amanullah was swift and extreme in his modernization and
nationalism reforms, he failed because he could not understand the religiosity and
inward-looking characteristic of Afghan society. However, another argument is the local
Afghan nationalist-narrative which presents Amanullah as a modernist Afghan who
wanted to modernize Afghanistan. However, it was not the Afghan people who dethroned
him; it was rather the British Government in India/Britain that plotted against his
regime.82

ones, who has also written an account about Afghanistan: Beyond Khyber Pass: Into Forbidden
Afghanistan (New York: the Century Company, 1925).
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See for example Ghobar (1987), pages 808-826; Mohammad Wali, tawtaya-e englees
dar suqot-e dawlat-e ala’hazrat Amanullah Khan: The English Plot in Falling of H.M.
Amanullah Khan’s Government (Peshawar: Alqalam Press, 2009); Hasan Kakar, da padshah
Amanullah Wakmana-e ta yaw naway-e katana: A New Opinion about King Amanullah’s Regime,
(Germany: Afghanistan Literary Society, 2005); and Abdul Khaliq Ikhlas , Isteqlal Aman-ya: The
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This is, as it was explained above, how one would understand nationalism in
Afghanistan; like a tale that is told and is retold and retold. It all starts from Habibullah’s
enthroning, his reforms, Habibya College, and Siraj Al-Akhbar to Habibullah’s
assassination. The tale picks up again from Amanullah, his War of Independence against
the British, and his radical reforms to his exile.
The Problems of Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan

It is evident from the above hegemonic narrative that previous studies of nationalism
in Afghanistan lack a theoretical analysis of the subject. It is like a folk tale. The entire
narrative is about “great men” such as the “Iron emir,” Abdur Rahman Khan, the
moderate emir, Habibullah Khan, the “true Afghan,” Amanullah Khan, and modernist
Afghan, Mahmud Tarzi. This “great men” history has several weaknesses that are rooted
in how these studies are done. In fact, the theories of postcolonial studies, such as the
subaltern, post-modernism, and hegemonic theories as useful analytical tools of
postcolonial studies of nationalism, are absent of Afghan history. For instance, the
subaltern theory could talk about the very ordinary people for whom the nationalists
claimed equality and inclusiveness while in reality they were marginalized, used and
abused. A useful collection of essays on the subject of nationalism and subaltern
communities is The Forging of Nationhood (2003), edited by Gyanendra Pandey and
Peter Geschiere. The essays offer a subaltern postcolonial view and critique of modernity
and nationalism, which has been so far neglected by the previous studies of nationalism
Independence of Amanullah (Kabul: Matb-e Bayhaqi, 2005). For a discussion of Amanullah’s
reforms and his failures to modernize Afghanistan in the face of the so-called tribal and
conservative society of Afghanistan, see Leon Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan,
1919-1929: King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize A Tribal Society, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1973).
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in Afghanistan. Their argument is that nationalism as an idea that positions itself for
justice and inclusion excludes many people in whose names the nationalists propagate
their agenda. In Afghanistan, for example, it is not clear how ordinary people felt about
the nationalist activities and the manner such actions influenced the Afghan state. Thus,
previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan do not explain whether or not the ordinary
Afghans shared similar views about the Afghan state or the reforms about modernization
that were central to the conversation. As it will be showed in chapter three (“Reforms in
Education”), nationalism was an elite project in Afghanistan during the period 19011929.
The Afghans who propagated an Afghan national idea formed a small elite class in
Kabul, the capital of the country, and other urban centers. In addition to the problem of
elitism, the other serious problem which the studies of nationalism in Afghanistan
encounter is the lack of definition of what constituted nationalism in Afghanistan during
the period under study. In other words, these studies talk about the opening of new school
and reform of the education system, in which new subjects such as history, geography,
and chemistry were taught. However, it is not explained how the school was organized,
what were the forms of order and disciplines by which the schools were regulated, what
kind of “Afghan history” they taught in the school, and how the Afghan state used the
hegemonic institutions of education to expand its power and control the populace.
By focusing on the modernization reforms only, the previous studies of nationalism in
Afghanistan neglected the very meaning of nationalism. As Breuilly states in the opening
of his Nationalism and the State (1994), “nationalism is above and beyond all else, about
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politics and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about
control of the state. The central task [for a nationalist or the state] is to relate nationalism
to the objectives of obtaining and using state power.”83 By attending to question of
power, class, and cultural institutions, this thesis will use subaltern and post-modernist
theories to address its main question: how did the Afghan state and Afghan nationalists
used modernist reforms in education to propagate a national idea for Afghanistan?
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Breuilly (1994), 1.

Chapter Three: Reforms in Education
Few years ago [before 1919], you were unaware. In everywhere, you were to be
identified in the name of others. Even when you were going to pilgrimage to
Mecca, you were traveling as Iranians and Turks because you did not have
Afghan Passport and Tazkara.84 Now [since 1919] that you have an independent
[country, Afghanistan], I wish you freedom until the Resurrection…Therefore;
you must get passport and Tazkara. I have been informed that you have said; if
you have gotten a passport or if you get one, you will be enlisted in the army and
etc. This is not true. Don’t perceive bad the benefits of having Tazkara and
passport. 85

A limited but important number of studies have already engaged the topic of
modernization reforms in Afghanistan. However, the study of nationalism in Afghanistan
and reforms is incomplete and problematic. The attempt is here to re-examine critically
nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of the reforms that occurred in educational
system in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929. Therefore, although the Afghan state
implemented a number of reforms in the army, bureaucracy, laws, and education, the
reforms in education will be assessed thoroughly here. The issue central to the discussion
is education reform in Afghanistan as it was implemented from 1901 till 1929. Before a
discussion of nationalism in Afghanistan and education is examined in this chapter, an
explanation of the relationship between modernity and nationalism is offered in order to
conceptualize the question of why the Afghan nationalists thought that the reforms in
education were needed for Afghanistan.
*tazkara, which is an Arabic word and means “mentioning” or “recalling” is the literal
name of National ID Card in Afghanistan. In its Persianized form, tazkara literally could mean all
of the followings: biographer, biography of one person, a collection of biographies, and it can
also specifically mean “passport.”
85
This is a portion of Amanullah Khan’s statement to Afghans who were living in
Mumbai or as it was known during the British Raj as Bombay. Amanullah Khan gives a speech
when he visits India as part of his grand tour of Europe and a number of other countries during
the 1927-1928. His meeting with “Afghans of Bombay” was arranged by the Afghan Consulate
and Afghans’ community there. His trip will be fully discussed in chapter four, “Symbolizing
Afghanistan.” For the full text of the speech, see Aziz’ul-ddin Wakil Popalzai, Safarhay-e Ghazi
Amanullah Shah: dar duwazdah keshwar-e asya wa europa. The Trips of Shah Amanullah Ghazi:
In Twelve Countries of Asia and Europe, 1928-1928, (Kabul: Matb-e Dawlati, 1985), 37-39.
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Conceptualizing Modernity

The concept of modernity is not an unambiguous term. First, there are terminological
difficulties and ambiguities with the term. Terms such as “pre-modern,”
“modernity,”“postmodernism,” and “anti-modernism,” “Western,” or “Western
modernity,” “Muslim modernity,” “Japanese modernity,” and “Turkish modernity” are
conceptually vague constructs. Second, modernity does not have a clear temporal date. In
other words, the periodization of modernity is a subjective selection. For example, in
world history “modernity” can be located in and beyond the sociopolitical developments
of industrial capitalism as Max Weber would argue. The Byzantine, Chinese and
Islamicate modernities (Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires) of 1000-1900 A.D are
famous examples. These empires were highly bureaucratic, sophisticated, and thus quite
modern. Additionally, there is not an intellectual consensus on approaches of modernity
too.86
In order to simplify the concept of modernity in this thesis, this chapter approaches
modernity from the perspective of “reform nationalism.” Reform nationalism is the
perspective that many non-European countries copied and adopted European social and
political institutions such as national anthem or national army and or national education
in order to claim national sovereignty, identity, and territoriality, though they rejected the
cultural superiority of the west. In this process of reforming, small classes of the local
elites were the pioneers. Their desires and expectations to modernize their countries
Two useful articles that describe the multiple “modernities,” and history of modernity
are by Hefner Robert, “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing
Age,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 27 (1998), 83-104; and Peter V.D. Veer, “The Global
History of Modernity,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 41, no. 3
(1998), 285-94.
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along the European lines were based on their experiences, observation, and knowledge
that they have developed from living in, reading about, traveling to, and having
connection and interaction with Europe and Europeans. Because of the Europe’s
advanced military might, the local elites and their state invested locally to reform first the
military. However, they then also began to reform other institutions of the state such as
education system. 87
In Afghanistan too, the Afghan nationalists used reform nationalism in propagating a
sense of national identity, and they did it by imitating the European sociopolitical
institutions. Below, the Afghan nationalists’ reforms in education system are thoroughly
explored with emphasis on making of a modern curriculum and the organization of the
schools between 1904 and 1929.
Mohammad Abid: The Indian Muslim Spy, Traveler, Teacher?

Mohammad Adib, a Muslim Indian, arrives in “the holy land of Afghanistan”
sometime between 1904 and December 15, 1916. While it is difficult to ascertain the
exact date of his arrival, it is evident from the sources that Adib was subsequently invited
to the Darul Sultana-e Kabul or the Royal Court of Kabul. Because he lacked knowledge
of the Persian language, which was the state language, he “was not able to become aware
and assess the real progress and changes in the educational improvement of this Islamic
country.” Although he spends his time in Kabul around and associated with state
officials, he never articulated his reasoning for coming to Kabul. It can be speculated
that he was sent by the British Raj as a spy to produce a report of educational changes in

See Breuilly (1994), chapter 11, for a useful discussion of “reform nationalism.” The
chapter offers three case-studies of reform nationalism about Japan, China, and Turkey.
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Afghanistan. There was also the possibility that he came on an educational or political
mission to Afghanistan on behalf of Muslims of India. In fact, the first two decades of
the 20th century was a period of increased Indian Muslim contacts with Afghans.
Politically, many Indian Muslims had embraced the idea of Pan-Islamism and had
expressed concern about the fate of the Ottoman Empire as the seat of the Caliphate.
Obviously such a position challenged to the colonial state in India. It will therefore also
not be out of place to think that Mohammad Adib came to Afghanistan to help the
Afghan nationalists to further reform their education. On the professional level, he could
have been contracted by the Afghan state to produce an assessment of the educational
reforms in Afghanistan. Lastly, it was also possible that Adib could have been one of the
many Indian Muslim teachers hired in Afghanistan between 1904 and 1929 to teach at
primary and secondary schools. The Indian Muslims connection with Afghan nationalists
was important between 1904 and 1929. When Habibullah went to India in 1907, he
established a Translation House in Calcutta where translators were paid to render new
European scientific books into Persian for use at the newly built schools in Afghanistan.88
This notwithstanding, these Indian teachers in Afghanistan could have served as British
spies.89
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See SA 2nd, No. 21, p.6. Although this source does not provide any other information
about who were these translators and how much they were paid, and what books they translated,
it only mentions that the translated books were sent to Kabul.
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For a useful and informative article about Indian Muslims’ pan-Islamic and nationalism
activities in Afghanistan, and how Islamic modernity including the Urdu Modernity and
nationalism of South Asia has influenced the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, see Nile
Green, “The Trans-border Traffic of Afghan Modernism: Afghanistan and the Indian
‘Urdusphere,’” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 53, no. 53 (2011), 470-508.
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Specifically to Mohammad Adib, there is evidence of the specific duties he
performed once he arrived in Kabul. Mawlawi Abdul Rab Khan who was the Principal
of Kabul Teacher Training Institute and also Head of Afghanistan’s Primary Schools
officially invited Adib to observe and assess a students’ exam day in one of the primary
schools in the city. Since Adib “was very interested in observing the schools [of
Afghanistan] because schools are the pillars of progress for every nation,” he accepted
the invitation to observe one of the exams on December 15, 1916. After a half hour walk
with Mawlawi Abdul in the center of Kabul city and to the surprise of Adib, the two
arrived at the school’s big gate. He had “never thought nor was told, and nor
remembered that there were these many organized and modernized primary schools in the
heart of Kabul city.” Adib wrote in his account when he entered inside the school, he was
so much shocked by the school’s discipline, order, and regulation. Adib spent some two
hours in the inspection office of the school where “(130) students were taking exams in
Quranic studies, Persian literature, math, and etc.”90
During this visit, Adib learned that there were “many other modernized schools in
Afghanistan.” He recorded his observation of his visit as follows:
[he] was entirely convinced that the savior and advancement of every nation and
government were its schools. Especially, if the schools’ teachers were to be from
that country’s people because the students could be more patriotic. Patriotism is
the love of religion, nation, state, and the king. Realization of this love is an
obligation of every person, without exception. Once realized, it will flow in the
blood of every person. Without doubts and questions, these [the love of religion,
nation, state, and the king] are the first foundation of any nation, which wants to
live free forever.
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The fact that Adib stayed in the Inspection office of the school tells that he was most
likely an educational inspector who was contracted by the Afghan state to assess the schools.
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Since Adib was shocked and surprised when he observed the discipline, order,
and awareness of the Afghan students in Kabul, he wrote that these achievements in
education were the results of the well-wish, high vision, and patriotic feelings of emir
Habibullah Khan. A more detailed observation of Adib of the educational reforms and
educational development in Afghanistan was published as an article in Siraj Al-Akhbar.
He wrote:
I would like to give my humble and neutral final observations by praising and
wishing-continuity for the Government of His Majesty Amir ul’Muminin91 (Siraj
ul’ Millat Wa Din), who is the cultivator of the seeds of education in
Afghanistan. It is an absolute obligation for all of the decent people of
Afghanistan to be thankful of the Almighty God who has granted them and their
92
country with such a just, progressive, and patriotic king.

There are two main issues that Adib raises in his discussion of the schools in Kabul
that frame this chapter’s examination of reforms in education and nationalism in
Afghanistan. One is the attempt of the Afghan state and the nationalists to establish a new
kind of education system, which would be public rather than entirely theological and
religious. Before 1904, education was solely available either in a madrassa, mosque, and
or at-home where a family member, usually the father, taught their children. There was
no public school system based on a state-sanctioned curriculum. The curriculum of the
91

Apart from many terminological problems (such as usage of emir, padshah, and shah
that produce conflicting meanings because the latter two are pre-Islamic Persian titles while emir
is Islamic), Adib uses the title of Amir Ul’Muminin, the Commander of the Faithful, for
Habibullah who did not have that title. His official title was Siraj ul’ Millat Wa Din, the Light of
the Nation and Religion. Since the position of the Ottoman Sultan, (Mehmed V, r. 1901-1918) as
the Caliph of Islam was soon to disappear during World War One when the Ottoman Empire was
defeated, Muslims of India, the so-called Khilafat Movement, was considering the Afghan emirs
(Habibullah Khan, and Amanullah Khan) to command the Muslims because they were ruling an
‘Independent’ Sunni-Muslim State in Afghanistan. The Shah of Iran, whose State was’
Independent’ too, was not an option for the Khilafat Movement because of Iran’s Shiaism. For a
discussion of Pan-Islamism and Afghanistan’s role during World War One, see Gregorian (1969),
especially pages 215- 223 and 234-239.
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madrassa, mosque, and in-home education covered subjects such as Quran, fiq, Islamic
jurisprudence, hadith or the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, and Perso-Islamic
literature such as Diwan-e Hafez Shirazi (the Persian collection of poems from Hafez
Shirazi who was a fourteenth century Iranian poet). This curriculum content could help
students learn the skills of reading and writing in Persian.93 Subjects, such as history or
geography that became popular with nationalism programs and nationalists, were absent
before 1904. Another issue which Adib raised was the order, discipline, and love-of the
homeland and the king that were emphasized in the new state-sanctioned curriculum in
Afghanistan. In the examination of the new state-sanctioned curriculum and the
organization of the schools in the section immediately below, three questions are
explored—the examination of the reformed-curriculum, the organization of the schools,
and how the Afghan state and the nationalists addressed nationalism in Afghanistan in the
context of reforms in education. Before doing that, it is however useful to know how
education and nationalism are related nationalistically.
The variables such as religion, language, geography, and history have strong
appeals to scholars, and they are important to studying nationalism. But, “a man’s
education,” as Ernest Gellner explained of the relationship between nationalism and
education, “is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on
him.” The fundamental output that education produces, according to Gellner, is loyalty of
the citizens to a nation. This is only possible in a modern nation-state; Gellner calls it
“Industrial Society.” The pre-condition to such an output is a standardized curriculum,
93

Diwan-e Hafez Shirazi is locally and colloquially known in Afghanistan as Khuja
Hafez. It still is one of the primary textbooks for literacy education in the mosques, religious, and
private homes across Afghanistan.
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“especially in national subjects like literature, geography, history, and physical
education.” Since loyalty is gained through the standardized curriculum, the state, the
monarch, and the nationalists will do everything possible to establish such a curriculum
in order to instill loyalty to the state, monarch, and nation. 94 In Afghanistan too, the state
and the nationalists tried to establish such a kind of education, which could produce
loyalty to the state. As a matter of fact, if there was one theme that most thrilled (and kept
busy) the Afghan nationalists to propagate it throughout the period, 1901-1929, it was the
importance of modern education for Afghan people.
The Importance of Education

The Afghan state and the nationalists propagated that modern education, like the
one that Europeans had, was necessary for Afghan nation in order to progress. It was
neither against Islam. It is said, for example, that when Habibullah went to India in 1907,
in one of his speeches in Lahore he had said: “o my Moslem brethren, endeavor to
acquire knowledge, so that you may not wear the cloths of the ignorant. It is your duty to
acquire knowledge. After your children have thoroughly acquainted themselves with the
principles and laws of the faith of Muhammad, turn their attention towards the
acquirement of the new sciences, as unless you acquire Western knowledge, you will
remain without bread.” Habibullah is quoted again thus: “there are those who utter
solemn warnings in your ears, who urge that Mohammedans have nothing to do with
modern philosophy, who disclaim against Western sciences as though they are evil. I am
not among them. I am not among those who ask you to shut your ears and your eyes. On
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the contrary, I say pursue knowledge wherever it is to be found.”95 After two years of its
establishment, Siraj Al-Akhbar published an article by Mahmud Tarzi, now the chief
editor under the title of alem wa ma’rafat or Education & Awareness.96 “Education
means to be knowledgeable,” wrote Mahmud Tarzi. He continued that education “is the
ability to distinguish, and to have awareness. Its benefits are obvious from how much
holy and precious these words are. A nation is like a [human] body, its soul is education.
A nation is asleep, education awakens it. No nation or a people can neither progress nor
awake and can’t also survive without education.”97 In another occasion, he published an
article under the title of “Khuwab dar tariki or Asleep in Darkness.” In the article, he
goes on to praise the value of modern education for advancement of a nation, and its
importance specifically to the Afghan nation. He says that Afghans have to learn from
Japanese. “Take for example,” he writes, “the Japanese who had nothing. Now after some
years, they have everything. They have knowledge and expertise in society, politics, and
[political] parties. What did they do? They sent their children all over the world after
education. Like bees they spread all over the fields of the world. Now, they have
industry. They have no darkness. This means that their mind has awakened. With
education and art gained, they have benefited their homeland.”98
In addition to Mahmud Tarzi who was the pioneer of modern education, and
wrote on its importance to Afghan nation, several other nationalists also wrote about the
importance of education. Among them were individuals such as Enyayatullah Khan (the
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eldest son of Habibullah), Amanullah Khan, (who later becomes king and enlarges the
scope of reforms), Abdul Hadi Dawi (bureaucrat, poet, educator, and diplomat),
Muhyiuddin Anis (journalist, writer, and educator), and many more. What is important to
note here is that the modern education based on a new state-sanction curriculum was
emphasized for the sake of progress of the Afghan nation as well as for its making of
Afghans in serve and hold loyalty to the state and the king. To understand the nature of
the content of this new education and how it was organized, Habibya College’s
curriculum and administration will be thoroughly examined.
Habibya College, 1904

In 1904, Habibullah Khan opened Afghanistan’s first secondary school, called
“Habibya” College. The level of education and translation of the name of “Habibya” into
English are problematic. First, there is no consensus on whether “Habibya” was an
elementary or a secondary school. Many writers have agreed that it could be generally
labeled as a “college” level institution where both primary and secondary educations
were offered. Second, many of the textbooks that were taught at “Habibya” classified the
school variously thus adding to the confusion. For example, all of the following names
appear in various textbooks for Habibya College: Baytul’ulum-e Mubaraka-e Habibya
(The Holy Education House of Habibya), Madrasa-e Habibya, (Habibya School),
Madrasa-e Mubaraka-e Habibya-e Darul Sultana-e Kabul (The Holy Habibya School of
the Royal Court of Kabul), Maktab-e Habibya (Habibya School), and Lycee Habibya
(Habibya High School). The third designation, Madrasa-e Mubarak-e Habibya-e Darul
Sultana-e Kabul appears in Habibya’s Nizamnamah or Law Concerning Habibya (1913).
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Because of various designations for Habibya, it can be assumed here that there were
corresponding changes in the school’s curriculum. For example, Habibya was offering
eleven subjects between 1904 and 1919. In 1929, it offered at least thirteen subjects.99
For the sake of simplicity about the name of Habibya and its level of education, this
thesis will refer to Habibya as “Habibya College.” The mission of Habibya College was
to produce loyalty to the emir, “who was just and progressive, and wanted to advance the
nation” of Afghanistan. In addition to being loyal to the emir, its graduates “would
provide services that are needed by the government of Afghanistan.”100 Habibya, as it
was the first modern educational institute in Afghanistan and was named after Habibullah
himself, had two features that distinguished it from the religious schools. One was that
its education was based on the state-sanctioned standardized curriculum. Its other feature
was the organization of the school.
Curriculum

Unlike madrassa, mosque, and in-home education where one was offered religious
and literacy education, Habibya (and later in the 1920s other schools to follow,) offered
classes also in science, art, and social sciences such as drawing, history, geography, and
foreign languages such as Urdu and English. The curriculum was divided into two main
levels: primary and secondary. The primary level that could take four years to complete
covered five subjects: Dunyat or Islamic-Teaching, Language (Dari, the Afghan Persian),
Math, Geography, and Mashqo-Khat or Writing. Daraja-e rashidya or the secondary

These subjects are discussed in detailed in the section of “curriculum.”
See SA 2nd year, No. 22, p. 7-9 where Prince Enayatullah, who was the chief of
Afghanistan’s Education Association, talks to the students and teachers of Habibya College while
visiting the college.
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level that could last four years had at least thirteen subjects. These were Quran-e Karim,
Dunyat, Akhlaq wa Malumat-e Madina or Ethics and Citizenry Information, Language,
Writing & Calligraphy, History, Geography, Mathematics (Algebra, Trigonometry, and
Geometry), Physics, Chemistry, Natural History (Animals, Plants, and Geology),
Painting & Drawing, and Music. Some of these subjects were offered collectively. For
example, Quran and Dunyat or Math and Algebra were taught at one session. For the first
three years of the secondary level, the students were to learn the science, social science,
and religious subjects. The fourth year was devoted to learn linguistic and technical
subjects. For languages, in the secondary level education, one could take one of the
following languages: Dari, Pashto, Turkish, Arabic, Urdu, and English. What is
interesting here is that “Pashto,” one of the two main languages of Afghanistan (the other
being Dari/Persian), was listed next to English as a foreign language. Ghobar, who grew
up during this time in Kabul and was later in touch with students of Habibya, mentions
that this was a work of Indian Muslim teachers who were hired to teach at Habibya. They
used the English textbook that was taught in India where the British taught Pashto and
English as foreign languages. Ghobar wrote that “the contents of the English textbook
about Afghan history were pejorative.” More than that, he argues that the Indian Muslim
teachers were not effective and productive because in India as “Muslims, they were not
having access to technical, chemical, and scientific education such as mineralogy,
engineering, and political philosophy. They only had two options as Muslim students:
either study religious or Arabic linguistic studies.”101
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Aside from science and technical subjects, Habibya and other schools found social
science subjects such as history, geography, and literature more interesting because they
related to nationalism. In Habibya, for example, the new curriculum was to make it
possible for an Afghan to study the history, geography, and literature of not only
Afghanistan, but also other nations. To understand the new state-sanctioned curriculum
and discuss its relationship to the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, few of the
textbooks that were used in Habibya and other schools are thoroughly explored below. In
here, two social science subjects are examined: history and geography.
In Geography & History of Afghanistan, a primary textbook for secondary and higher
education students including students of Habibya, the goal was to introduce the history
and territory of Afghanistan. Mohammad Ali Khan, the author of Geography & History
of Afghanistan, was a teacher in Habibya. He wrote in his introduction of the book that he
had used English sources for writing Geography & History of Afghanistan. Therefore,
everything could not be granted as true. However, he thought that it was still necessary to
write a textbook about the history and geography of Afghanistan. Ali Khan had used
twenty sources, mostly books that were produced in British Colonial India by the colonial
officials. From the twenty sources, thirteen of them are famous colonial accounts
including Mountstuart Elphinstone’s An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815),
Alexander Burns’ Travels Into Bokhara (1834), and Encyclopedia Britannica.
Geography & History of Afghanistan is divided into two parts: part one talks
about the territory of Afghanistan while part two is about the history of Afghanistan.

Education Curriculum, (1923), 2-3 for the list of subjects that were taught in the secondary level.
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“Afghanistan is located,” reads chapter one of Geography & History, “in the center of
Asia. Its three neighbor countries are Hindustan, Bokhara, and Russia. Since many of its
people are Afghans, which is why it is named Afghanistan.”102 The book then talks about
rivers, mountains, passes, mineral mines and resources, climate, animals, plants,
agricultures, crafts, and merchandises of Afghanistan. Take for example Afghan crafts
and industry. When it introduces the crafts and industry that are available in Afghanistan,
the book writes: “for the progress and improvement of the country, the government had
enacted laws that intend to promote the crafts and industry in the country. At the same
time, it encourages people to purchase goods of watan or the homeland rather than
foreign.” “Well-liked goods of” Afghanistan, the book lists, are “carpets, silks, and
karakuls.”103
After situating the territorial location of Afghanistan in Asia and its neighbor
countries, the chapter of Geography & History, “History of Afghanistan,” introduces the
ancient, medieval, and modern history of Afghanistan. It introduces Afghans as a people
who ““before Islam, identified themselves as descendent of Saul, the King of Israel.”
However, Afghanistan “was known to Greeks as Aria or Arianna, Afghanistan’s ancient
name. Afghans had always lived independently. They have defended their country
against Alexander, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Nadir Afshar [eighteenth century TurkicPersian Shah of Iran], and British.” 104 The rest of the chapter on the history of
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Afghanistan narrates the same traditional introduction of Afghanistan’s history:
Afghanistan is ancient Ariana, the main-home of Aryans. When Alexander conquered
Persia, the Greek Kingdoms established themselves as Greek-Bactrian Kingdoms in the
second and first century B.C in Afghanistan. Afterward, the Buddhist Kushan Empire
was established in Afghanistan from where it ruled up to India, and “Afghan and Indian
Buddhist monks spread Buddhism to China.”105 However, later, Islam spread and
Afghanistan became a Muslim country. After becoming Muslim, Afghanistan
experienced several foreign invasions such as “when Mongol Barbarians invaded” it.106
However, Ahmad Shah Abdali created modern Afghanistan in 1747. Then, Afghanistan
had several confrontations with the British in the nineteenth century in which “people of
Afghanistan never lost, and lived free.”107
In addition to the Geography & History of Afghanistan which was taught in the
1920s in Habibya and other schools in Kabul, Mahmud Tarzi had published an earlier
secondary education geography-history textbook, Mukhtasar-e Jughrafya’ya-e Omomi: A
Brief Introduction to General Geography (1915). Tarzi’s book, General Geography is
of Jews in Afghanistan, see Erich Brauer, “The Jews of Afghanistan: An Anthropological
Report,” Jewish Social Studies 4, no. 2 (1942),121-138. It should be noted that the Jewish Theory
is in complete contradiction to the “generalized” theory that Afghans are Aryans, and that is so
because their country was the original “native” homeland of the “Aryan Race.” As it was
addressed in the introduction of the paper, the Afghan Jewish Theory was a colonial imagination
of Sir William Jones, and other colonial officials in India. In here, the point to note is that the
Afghan nationalists dropped the Jewish Theory in favor of “Aryan” Theory.
105
See Kohzad (2008), 481.
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Ibid, 56-61. This is the traditional narrative of Afghanistan’s history that was taught at
schools in the 1920s. Like Mohammad Ali Khan’s textbook Geography and History of
Afghanistan, see for example Sayed Mohammad Hashim’s Khulasa-e Tarikh-e Watan; A Brief
History of the Homeland (1921), which has similar narrative. Hashim’s Brief History of the
Homeland was prepared for elementary-primary schools while Mohammad Ali Khan’s was for
secondary and higher education students.
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more interesting than Mohammad Ali Khan’s Geography & History for three main
reasons. One is that it introduces Afghan nation against other nations, which becomes
important for self-identification.108 Second, the book was prepared for high schools, and
specifically it was taught in the newly established Military School (1904-6 or 1909?)
where Tarzi was offered a class to teach geography and history.109 Third, General
Geography could have been appropriately named a “World Geography” or “Atlas of the
World” rather than General Geography because of its in-depth coverage and provision of
so much ethnographic, geographical, and historical information about the world and its
people.
Tarzi had the contents of General Geography divided into seven parts: Afghanistan,
General Geography, Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australia. Each part had several
lessons; for example, Australia had four lessons while Europe and Africa had each 19 and
21 lessons. At the end of each part, there was a table that had a list of famous cities,
lakes, rivers, islands, mountains, and a map of the particular continent (see figures
below). Then, all the way to the end of each part, there was a list of questions that
students had to answer.

In chapter four, “Symbolizing Afghanistan,” the subject of self-identification and
representation of Afghan nation against “other” nations will be discussed thoroughly.
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Mahmud Tarzi, Mukhtasar-e Jughrafya’ya-e Omomi: A Brief Introduction to General
Geography (Kabul: Matb-e Tipugraphi, 1915). 4. The date of establishment of Madrasa-e
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Take for example, its eleven lessons of the continent of Asia, twenty one lessons of
the continent of Africa, and nineteen lessons of Europe. Once these three continents’
geographical and ethnographic information, names of the countries, population, famous
cities, rivers, and mountains were taught to students, then, the students were evaluated for
content knowledge.
Asia, “Exam Questions:”
1. How much is the total area of Asia?
2.

How many countries exist in Asia?

3.

How many people live in Asia?

4.

Name the countries [of Asia]?

5. How many governors Anatolia had?
6.

What are Anatolia’s famous cities?

7. How many people lived in Arabia?
8.

Where is Mecca located and how many people live there?

9. What is the capital of Yemen?
10. How much is the total area of Afghanistan?
11. How many people live in Afghanistan?
12. What are the provinces of Afghanistan?
13. Where is located Prophet Muhammad’s cloak,110
14. In which river’s bank the city of Herat is located?
15. In which part of [Afghanistan] the Afghan Turkestan Province is located?
It is believed that a cloak, which was brought to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s Southern
Province by Ahmad Shah, the so-called “founder” of Afghanistan in 1760s, was worn by
Muhammad.
110
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16. Where Jalalabad is located, and are there any other provinces [in
Afghanistan]?
17. Is Siam a country and is it controlled by another foreign country?111
18. Where in Asia Japan is located?112
19. How many people live in Japan, what are its famous cities, and what have
been the reasons for its advancement and development?
20. What is the capital of Iran?
21. What are the famous rivers of Asia?
22. What are the famous mountains of Asia?113
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This question has a lot to do with nationalism in Afghanistan because Afghan
nationalists’ view was that Afghanistan was not a colonized nation, and so like Afghanistan, Siam
(modern Thailand), was one of the only Asian countries that could hold its sovereignty over its
territories and people against the rising colonial activities of the European colonialism in
Southeast Asia. For an excellent but also theoretical discussion of Thai Nationalism and
Colonialism, see Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origins and
Spread of Nationalism, especially pages 171-175.
112
Like Siam, Japan had a special place among Afghan nationalists between 1901 and
1933, and then beyond up to now. They saw Japan and Siam along with Afghanistan as
independent nations of Asia against European colonialism. Japan was an example for the reforms,
development, and modernity of Afghanistan. As matter of fact, Mahmud Tarzi, translated several
volumes of the history of Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 when an Asia power defeated and
destroyed a European imperial power. The Russo-Japanese War actually became an important
event for many nationalisms of Asia such as the Indian, Iranian, and others. See two useful
articles on the role of Russo-Japanese War and nationalisms in Asia by B. Nicolaevsky, “Russia,
Japan, and the Pan-Asiatic Movement to 1925,” The Far Eastern Quarterly, 8, no. 3 (1949), 259295; and Paul Rodell, “Southeast Asian Nationalism and the Russo-Japanese War: Reexamining
Assumptions,” Southeast Review of Asian Studies, 29 (2007), 20-40.
113
There are 24 more questions about Asia. See Tarzi (1915) pages 38-39 for the
complete list of the questions.
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Map of Asia, used in Afghanistan’s Education System, 1915-1929
(Figure, 4)

114

Africa, “Exam Questions:”
1. How much is the total area of Africa?
2.

How many countries exist in Africa, and how many people live in Africa?

3. Which countries [in Africa] are under the Ottoman Empire?
4. Which are the “Berberestan” [the Berbers’] countries and in which part of
Africa they are located?
5. Which are the Sub-Sahara countries?
6.

What countries exist in East Africa?

7. What are the famous rivers, lakes, and gulfs of Africa?
8. Which Government is ruling in Madagascar?
9. Where in Africa Hopetown is located?
10. In which country the Atlas Mountains are located?
11. Where does the Nile River fall?115
114

Ibid. See page 40 for the map of Asia.
115
Ibid, p. 48. It is said by Ghobar that by 1928 Afghanistan signed a diplomatic treaty
with Liberia, which was along with Ethiopia, an “independent” country in Africa where she was

67

Map of Africa, used in Afghanistan’s Education System, 1915-1929
(Figure, 5)
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Europe, “Exam Questions”
1. How many countries exist in Europe? Mention their capitals and population.
2. On which side of Europe Atlantic Ocean is located, and what are the famous
seas of Europe?
3.

Where is and who owns Shetland Island?

4. In which Sea the Gulf of Bothnia located, and where is the Malta Island?
5. The Baltic Sea is made of which ocean?
6. In which country the Balkan Mountains are located?
7. What is the name of the strait that is between Spain and Africa?
not colonized. See Ghobar (1987), p. 789. Where this treaty took place, who signed them on
behalf of Liberia and Afghanistan, why, and what does this explain about the nationalism
activities in Asia and Africa among the so-called uncolonized nations of Asia and Africa, are
questions that are yet unstudied. In chapter four, “Symbolizing Afghanistan,” Afghanistan’s
foreign relations and their relationship to nationalism in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929 will
be discussed.
116
Ibid, p. see page 49 for the map of Africa.
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8. Where is Caspian Sea?
9. If you would travel to London from Istanbul, what seas you will travel
through?
Map of Europe, used in Afghanistan’s Education System, 1915-1929
(Figure, 6)
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Tarzi in his General Geography, and Mohammad Ali Khan in his Geography &
History of Afghanistan, provided the tips here to situate the kind of curriculum the
Afghan state sanctioned in the new educational system between 1904 and 1929. Mahmud
Tarzi and Mohammad Ali Khan were not the first people to write a historical-geography
textbook in Afghanistan. In 1905, a textbook, Marat’al Arz or the Earth was prepared and
printed in Lahore, then British India, for elementary schools in Kabul. The book is
something like a World History-Geography textbook, which introduces first the shape,
117

Ibid, see page 23 for the map of Europe.
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size, and movement of the earth, and then the continents, and then continents’ location,
population, religion, and language of individual country. Like all of these individuals,
several other publishers made available other textbooks to the newly state-sanctioned
curriculum that introduced the geography and history of Afghanistan in relation to the
world. Sayed Mohammad Hashim, for example, published Khulasa-e Tarikhi-e Watan or
the Brief History of the Homeland in 1912.
In addition to Afghanistan’s people, geography, rivers, mountains, provinces, and
lakes, these textbooks covered pan-Islamic ideas (e.g. “which countries in Africa are
under the Ottoman Empire”), pan-Asian nationalism (e.g. the political independences of
Japan, Siam as opposite to the colonized nations of Asia), and ethnographic information
(e.g. population, lakes, and races). But more than the newly state-sanctioned curriculum,
it becomes interesting to review and understand the organization and administration of
schooling in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929: how schools and students were
organized, ordered, and controlled?
Organization
The education, progress, and ethics of the people of [Afghan] nation depend
on [how successfully] the administration of the primary schools of the
government [is carried out] where dear students of watan, the homeland, can
learn the required needs of education and the world, and develop intellect and
ability to enter into secondary and higher education….As per His Majesty, Siraj
ul ‘Millat wa Din’s [attention], the educational reforms and education are
improved in some degree. Unlike the past [where only mosques and madrassas
existed], the primary and secondary schools are increasing more and more in the
heart of Darul Sultana [Kabul city] where many students are educated. However,
there was a need to have a separate law concerning the enforcement of rules and
disciplines, and administration of primary schools.118
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This is a portion of a preface from Nizamnamah-e Makateb-e Iptidaya: Law
Concerning the Elementary-Primary Education (1914).
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From 1904 until 1929, the organization of schools was becoming more ordered and
regulated. In 1911 when Anjuman-e Maref or the Association of Education, the
predecessor of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education was established, the educational
system was already regulated and ordered. In 1913, Nizamnamah Madrasa-e Mubarak-e
Habibya Darul Sultana Kabul or Law Concerning Habibya College was passed. A year
later in 1914, Nizamnamah-e Tashkilat-e Maktab-e Iptidaya or Law Concerning the
Primary Schools was passed, and in 1921 it was re-enacted. In 1923 when Amanullah
Khan’s regime created the so-called “Afghanistan’s First Constitution,” primary
education for both boys and girls was made compulsory. 119 In the same year,
Nizamnamah Maktab-e Khanagee or Law Concerning Home-School was passed. In
1928, the government enacted educational Hidayat wa Majazat or Guidelines and
Punishments in education, which defined and created punishment and types of
punishments for students who committed offences such as incomplete homework or
frequent absentees. There were five kinds of punishments: rebuking, suspension, overassignments, after-school work, and physical punishment.120
To understand the organization, administration, and how schooling and students were
ordered, supervised, and eventually controlled, between 1901 and 1933, Habibya
College’s Nizamnamah (1911) is examined thoroughly.
In 1911 after nine years from its establishment, Nizamnamah Madrasa-e Mubaraka-e
Habibya Darul Sultana-e Kabul ordered Habibya. There was now an established chain of
supervision. Any wrongdoings against or failures to enforce Habiby’s Nizamnamah were
119
120

Government of Afghanistan (1923), 68th article of the 1923 constitution.
Later, these punishments will be explored more in detailed.
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unacceptable because the Nizamnamah was “approved by His Majesty, Siraj ul Millat wa
Din, who has cared, supported, and paid attention to the administration and improvement
of education and schools for the education of the people of Government of Afghanistan.
And Habibya College of Darul Sultana Kabul has been special for him since his
enthroning. Therefore, for the betterment and reforms of the rules and regulations of the
college, the articles of this law are created by the collective consensus of the Association
of Education of Government of Afghanistan.” 121 Upon the enactment of the Nizamnamah
for Habibya, the following appointments were made for the school: a General Inspector, a
Sarashta Dar or Principal, a Librarian, a Tahweeldar-e Omomi or General AccountingProcurement Official, a Tahweeldar-e Saman-e Tabiyat or a Printing-Publishing Official,
a School Doctor, and Clerks. According to the newly established academic and penal
codes, students and teachers were responsible for their assigned duties both inside and
outside of the school. 122
The General Inspector was responsible for making sure that the rules and
regulations of the Nizamnamah were enforced. Without any notice to the school and
students, the inspector visited Habibya once a week. He was also to inspect twice a year
all of the school’s accounting or cash-offices, tahweel’khana’ha and operations. If there
were any shortcomings or changes in the operation of the school, the inspector had to find
the causes. For instance, if Sarashta Dar or the Principal of the school was absent
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Nizamnamah Habibya, Law Concerning Habibya, (1911), 2.
Ibid, 3
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without reason, the inspector had to deduct from his salaries for days that he was
absent.123
Sarashta Dar was responsible for the supervision and management of Habibya and
also other primary schools. Between 1904 when Habibya was established and 1919 when
Habibullah was assassinated, there were only six primary schools in Kabul city.
According to one source, all of the six were “branches of Habibya College.”124 Sarashta
Dar was also responsible to inform, consult with, and recommend to the Education
Association of Afghanistan about the replacement of textbooks, performance of each staff
including teachers and their promotion, and selection of needy children who could be
supported by the local elders of Kabul districts. In addition, Sarashta Dar was to track
the presence and absence of the staff and teachers, determine their payroll scales, and
make sure that the library and offices were kept clean. At the end of each academic year,
he was to have a general meeting with the teachers to seek and collect their advices and
suggestions about the school. In short, Sarashta Dar was to inform the Education
Association about everything that took place in Habibya including supervision of the
exams. In effect, he presented a “fully detailed-three monthly report” about the quality
and improvement of exams and everything that affected the school. 125 Like the General
Inspector and Sarashta Dar, all other staff and teachers were hierarchically supervised.
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Ibid, 3-4.
Ghobar (1987), 702. Ghobar provides the names of these schools: Maktab-e Iptidaya
or primary school of Bagh-e Nawab, Tanor Sazi, Khafiha, Paranchaha, Khudam Hozur-e Aali,
and Hanud. Hanud was a Sikh’s school. The author could not find any information about what
subjects were taught, who were the teachers at this school since the Sikhs were (and are today) a
different religious and ethnic community in Afghanistan unlike the predominantly Muslims
population.
125
Nizamnamah Habibya (1911), 4-5
124
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In fact, the chain of supervision of the administration and supervision of Habibya went all
the way up to the emir: the emir was informed of developments in the school by the
Education Association, whose head was Enyayatullah, Muin’ul Sultana or Assistant to
the Emir, who was also Habibullah Khan’s eldest son. The Education Association
supervised Sarashta Dar, who in turn supervised Habibya’s staff, teachers, and
students.126
For students, their activities in classrooms and in their homes were also supervised
and ordered. A student could not be admitted first of all at Habibya College unless he had
the permission of his guardians, was between six and fifteen years old, had already
finished primary education, and was fully healthy. After a student was admitted at
Habibya, there were both rewards and penalties for him. Students who were decent and
paid attention to their studies were rewarded as their assignments were evaluated on a
scale of “well-done, excellent, and awarded prizes.” For example, a student could earn
60 points for a subject every week. From the 60, 30 to 40 points gained, a student
received an assessment of “well-done”. Additional 40 to 50 points could give him
“excellent,” and the additional of 50 to 60 extra points could make it possible for him to
win a “prize.” In order to be eligible to earn the rewards, which were one rupee for
elementary-primary student, two rupees for secondary education student, and three rupees
for high school student, a student needed 12 prizes.127
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For more information about the roles and responsibilities of each staff (Sarashta Dar,
Assistant to Sarashta Dar, Publisher, Accounting and Procurement Official, Inventory Official,
Doctor of School, and Clerk), see Nizamnamah Habibya (1911), 4-8 and 18-22.
127
Ibid, 8-9
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In addition to these prizes, there were two other main kinds of awards. One was the
annual awards that were given to three students who earned the first, second, and third
ranks in their classes. The other was the monthly award, in the form of financial aid for
an eligible student. Figure 7 (below) is one example of these awards that were offered
for primary education students who could take first, second, and third ranks in their
classes. It is useful to note that there was no award offered for the first year students of
primary education without regards to their rank in the class.128
(Figure 7, Awards’ Chart for Primary Education Students)
(Awards for Primary Education)
First Year (There is no Award)
Second Year:




1 Rank—5 Rupee
nd
2 Rank—4 Rupee
rd
3 Rank—3 Rupee





1 Rank—6 Rupee
nd
2 Rank—5 Rupee
rd
3 Rank—4 Rupee





1 Rank—8 Rupee
nd
2 Rank—6 Rupee
rd
3 Rank—5 Rupee

st

Third Year:
st

Fourth Year
st

Conversely, students were punished to bring in order to enforce the disciplines and
establish order in the institution. Overall, there were three main kinds of punishments:
physical, verbal (in front of teachers and students), and ousting from the school. Either of
the following situations could bring physical punishments to a student: if he was absent
or went out of school or class without permission, though the student was not to be

128

education.

Ibid, see pages 14-15 for tables of the awards for students of secondary and higher
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punished if he had gone for prayer; If he had not done the homework; and or if he had
fought, either physically or verbally with other students of the school in and or outside
the school premise or in the bazaars. A student could miss a day if he had a written notice
submitted the next day for the teacher or assistant of Sarashta Dar from his parents.129
However, this notice will be valid only for three days of absences. Decision for a week of
absence was left to the discretion of only Sarashta Dar. For a month, only the General
Inspector could allow students to be absent. However, for more than a month, Muin’ul
Sultana or the Assistant to the Emir will make the decision.130 A student could be
verbally punished in front of teachers and students if he had committed the following
wrongdoings: smoking; gambling; fighting; and showing carelessness to the teacher and
parents. A student was to be expelled from the school if he had been verbally punished
three times in front of teachers and students, and or if he had conducted or caused
immoral activities at school and to his classmates. However, if a student was to be
expelled, the school could not do it by itself. Several teachers along with Sarashta Dar
had to make a collective decision, and then inform the Education Association where the
Assistant to the Emir was to make the final expelling decision. 131
In addition to the administrative and academic supervision of Habibya College and
students, and rewards and punishments, Habibya’s Nizamnamah established rules and
regulations for the conduct of exams, library administration, registrar office, and the
leaves. For example, articles 38 and 39 of Habibya’s Nizamnamah regulated and ordered
exams to take place three times a year—two of them written and one verbal-written
129

Ibid, 17.
Ibid
131
Ibid, 8-10
130
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exam. The two written exams were only for secondary and higher educational (Teacher
Training) students. Written exams were conducted twice a year while the one verbalwritten exam was conducted once a year. The written exams did not have to last more
than one week. Other articles, 39 to 52, created additional rules and regulations that
ordered and regulated the exams, students, and the school.132
Chapter three, conclusion

Between 1904 and 1929, the Afghan state brought about a number of reforms
primarily in the educational system in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. These reforms
were later extended to other major urbanate provinces. The Afghan state and the
nationalists propagated the importance of modern education (in addition to the religious
learning) for Afghans in the name of modernizing and progress. The new education had a
state-sanctioned curriculum and laws that aimed at cultivating Afghan loyalty to the state,
and to serve it. The students were required to behave orderly and regularly in accordance
to the established rules and codes. Failures to do so and successes to accomplish the
rules, regulations, and laws of the curriculum and school could bring punishments and
rewards. Throughout the era, 1904-1929, Habibya College remained a model to be
imitated by other schools in Kabul and the country. However, in addition to Habibya and
its six branches in Kabul, many other reforms in education took place and laws were
enacted to regulate and order them. In the 1920s, three other secondary schools, one
French (Aman-ya, 1922), another German (Amani, 1923), and Ghazi (1927, with English
as the language of medium instruction) were established in Kabul. Observing that the
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Ibid, see pages 10-12 for articles and 37-52 that deal with rules and regulations of
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neighboring and Muslim countries such as Iran had already been sending their nationals
to study in Europe, in 1921 and 1922 a total of 80 students (from “upper-class families”)
were sent to study in France and Germany.133 In the 1920s, the state opened girls’ schools
too. 134 These reforms and laws were enacted in order to help the Afghan state to
establish a new kind of education that was to be regulated and ordered so that
Afghanistan could progress as a modern nation where students could serve the state.
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Gregorian (1967), 242. On the issue of observing the neighboring countries, Tulu-e
Afghan-the Rise of Afghan, the first newspaper of Afghanistan’s southern province, Kandahar
(established in 1921), published an article under the title “Sending of Iranian Students [to
Europe].” In the article, the author suggests to its readers that “Afghanistan’s neighbor Iran had
decided to send a large number of students to Europe for education. Iran has already sent a group
of ten students. They are now in Constantinople on their way to Europe.” See Tulu-e Afghan, 1st
Year, No. 25, p. 2. Interestingly, this is the same year as Amanullah sends 80 Afghan students to
France and Germany.
134
See Gregorian (1967) pages 243-244 for a discussion of girls’ education in the 1920s
in Afghanistan.

Chapter Four: Symbolizing Afghanistan, 1901-1929
I would like to inform you my dear country fellow brothers about my trip so that you and
other brothers of mine should become aware of why Amanullah traveled to foreign
countries. The purpose of my trip to foreign countries is known in some degree among
those of you who are the servants of the government because on the day of my departure,
November 30, 1927, I announced it, and you agreed with me. The idea to traveling to
Europe was suggested to me by the Cabinet Ministers Council. Of course, you the
conscious group better know that my purpose was to examine the scientific progress and
establish friendly relations with the foreign states in order to let the world become aware
of Afghanistan’s state of affairs and we would become fully aware of the world. It is very
hard to live alone in the world. A people must form relationships with other international
human community, and ought to live according to the conditions, science, and technology
of the time. Today, Europe is the center of material progress. Of course, we are not lesser
than anybody in our integrity, and we consider our holy religion Islam better than
everybody’s. And we don’t need to imitate anybody in this. However, in regards to the
material progress of the world, we have to imitate the materially advanced centers of the
world. 135

The above passage is a portion of Amanullah’s statement that was delivered to
students and employees, who were brought near the newly constructed building, Qasr-e
Stor or the Star Palace, the building of the Foreign Ministry to hear from Amanullah
about his trip to a number of countries in Asia and Europe.136 For the Afghan state and
the nationalists in Kabul it was important to symbolize Afghanistan because
symbolization of the country legitimated their nationalism both inside and outside
Afghanistan. In here, symbolization or symbols are used to designate a situation in which
one state or a people claim sovereignty over a territory and culture. This was indeed the
situation with the Afghan nationalists who constantly tried to introduce Afghanistan as a
sovereign country that had its own territory, people, and culture. For instance, Habibullah
created a National Unity Day, which functioned as a symbol of unity of Afghan people.
Afghans were encouraged to appreciate and celebrate the day and “feel obligated to be
thankful for his majesty, and love the just, progressive, and thoughtful king of the Afghan
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Popalzai (1985), 289
In the second part of this chapter, Amanullah’s trip will be fully discussed.
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nation.”137 Although during Habibullah’s reign (1901-1919) a number of efforts were
carried out in order to symbolize Afghanistan as a nation of its own among other nations
of the world, the major efforts in symbolization of Afghanistan were carried out between
1919 and 1929.
Therefore, this chapter will focus on the symbolization efforts of the Afghan state
and nationalists during this period, 1919-1929. The chapter is divided into two parts. Part
one will discuss the symbolization efforts that were carried out inside Afghanistan. Part
two will discuss the external symbolization efforts of the Afghan state and the
nationalists.
Part One: Internally Symbolized Afghanistan

The period between 1919 and 1929 can be safely characterized as an era of
incrusted state symbols in Afghanistan. The symbols were created to symbolize
Afghanistan both at home and abroad in order to legitimate the “Afghan state” in the eyes
of people. At home, the symbols appeared generally in two forms. One was ceremonial
celebration of national themes and days, and another was tangible symbols such as flags.
The National Day of Independence, the National Anthem, the National Holiday, the
National Education, the National History, and the Father of Nation were major symbolic
ceremonies and constructs while “The National Medal,” “The National Flag,” and
“national currency” became tangible symbols of the state. For instance, between 1922
and 1929, there were at least ten ‘national’ medals invented to decorate the Afghan
nation. Six out of the ten national medals (see figures below) were ceremonial and
relevant to the symbolization of Afghanistan. These were Nishan-e Lemar or the Sun
137

SA, 2nd year, No 21, p. 2-3.
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Medal, Nishan-e Isteqlal or the Independence Medal, Nishan-e Stor or the Star Medal,
Nishan-e Wafa or the Loyalty Medal, Nishan-e Loy Khan or the Great Khan Medal, and
Nishan-e Shuja ‘at or the Bravery Medal.138 For example, Nishan-e Lemar was the
highest medal of Afghanistan. It was given to a person, Afghan or foreigner, who had
provided an exceptional service either militarily or politically in and or outside
Afghanistan, which had improved significantly the situation and status of Afghan people,
and had increased the greatness of the kingdom.
When Amanullah went to Egypt, as part of his grand tour of Asia-Africa-Europe,
he honored Fuad I, King of Egypt (r. 1917-1936) with a Nishan-e Lemar, though this
author has not found anything that could reveal what did Fuad I had done to “improve
significantly the situation and status of Afghan people” in order to receive the Nishan-e
Lemar.139 However, it could be possible that he was honored for his reception and
welcoming of Amanullah and his delegation in Egypt.140 Persons nominated to receive
Nishan-e Lemar were introduced to the king by the Minister’s Council. In addition to its
actual ornamented metallic symbol, Nishan-e Lemar’s prize was two kinds. One could
earn the highest honor of Lemar or the high honor of Lemar. For the highest honor, the
prize was five hundred jerib lands (one jerib equals to 10,000 square meters) with 50,
000 rupees cash. And Lemar’s high honor prize was two hundred fifty jerib lands with
15, 000 rupees cash.141
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For the complete list of the medals, see Nizamnamah-e Nishanahay-e Zeenishan
Dawlat-e Aalay-e Afghanistan: Law Concerning the Medals of Government of Afghanistan
(1922)
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See Popalzai (1986) page 72 for Nishan-e Lemar that was given to Fuad I of Egypt.
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Later in this chapter, Amanullah’s visit to Egypt is discussed in detail.
141
Ibid, 2-3.
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Another medal, for example, that had a local symbolic appealing inside
Afghanistan was Nishan-e Loy Khan or the Great Khan Medal. This was to be given to a
person who had accomplished some kind of patriotic works and had improved
brotherhood relations among Afghans inside Afghanistan. Its prize was the title Loy
Khan with forty jerib lands.142
(Figures, 8 and 9: Lemar Highest and High Honor Medals)
8, Highest Lemar

9, High Lemar

The Persian text beneath figure 9, right image, reads: “Nishan-e Lemar Aali,
Lemar High Medal—is created in the year 1920 by the Council of the
Government of Afghanistan.”
(Figures, 10 and 11, Independence Medals)

10

142

11

Ibid, 13: in 1928 when Amanullah was satisfied with the preparation, arrangement,
and planning of his visit in Egypt and Turkey, Ghulam Jilani Charkhi (1886-1933), who was
Afghanistan’s Minister to Turkey, was “honored” with Nishan-e Lemar Aali or Nishan-e Lemar’s
High Honor. see Ibid, 92.
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(Figure, 12: Nishan-e Loy Khan or the Great Khan)
12

The Persian beneath Figure 12, above image, reads: “Nishan-e Loy
Khan—is created in the spring of 1920 by the Government Council.”143

In addition to the medals that became tangible symbols of nationalism in
Afghanistan and represented and legitimated the state power, the Afghan state and the
nationalists changed Afghanistan’s flag four times between 1919 and 1929 in order to
find a ‘national’ flag. When Amanullah came to power in 1919, he abolished the previous
government and personal flags that existed in the country. In the first attempt, the flag
was decorated with a royal insignia on the top of a domed mosque with two crossed
swords beneath it. The whole flag was positioned within a circle, and was surrounded by
rays, which in turn made the flag an eight-pointed star.144 This was also the first official
or national flag of Afghanistan because it was adopted in 1919 when Afghanistan became
an independent country. The second attempt was in 1926 when the 1919 flag was
modified, in which the two crossed swords, the royal insignia, and the eight-pointed star
were replaced with wreath, though the domed mosque still stayed in the center of the

143

For a list of all medals with their images, see the Images Section of Popalzai (1985).
According to Habib Borjian (1999), this eight-pointed star was an imitation of the
Ottoman Royal flags of the 1900s. This could be possible because Mahmud Tarzi, who had spent
many years in the Ottoman Empire, became instrumental after 1919 when he was appointed as
Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. See Habib Borian’s informative and useful entry, "Flags of
Afghanistan." Encyclopedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/flags-ii (accessed
February 16, 2012).
144

83

whole flag. In 1928 when Amanullah came back from Europe where he saw that the
European countries’ flags (e.g. France’s flag) were tricolor and non-religious and
represented ‘progress,’ he also changed Afghanistan’s flag. Now, the mosque was
replaced, and the new tricolor (black, red, and green) flag had a chain of mountains, a
rising sun from behind the mountains, a star, and two sheaves of wheat.145 Apparently,
the black color represented Afghanistan’s past anti-colonial opposition. Red showed the
struggle of Afghans during and for independence and the green, optimism, was about the
future of Afghanistan. In 1929 when Nader Khan was enthroned, he replaced the
mountains and the rising sun with the mosque and an eight-pointed star, though he kept
Amanullah’s tricolor.
(Figure, 13: Afghanistan’s 1919-1926 Flag)

The role of “sheaves of wheat” has a symbolic significance among the Afghan
nationalists. The story goes that in 1747 “after nine days of talk during an assembly of the Afghan
tribes, Ahmad Abdali [the so-called “founder” of Afghanistan] was enthroned by Saber Shah-e
Kabuli….Saber, who was a religious and political Sufi, stood up in the assembly and introduced
Ahmad Abdali as the king and placed a sheaf instead of a crown in the hat/turban of him.” So,
since Ahmad Abdali, whom is characterized as the “father of nation,” was enthroned with sheaf
or sheaves wheat, the nationalists also adopted the sheaves in important symbolic and ceremonial
occasions of Afghanistan. For enthroning of Ahmad Shah Abdali/Durrani, see Ghobar (1987),
354-355.
145
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(Figure, 14: Afghanistan’s 1928-1929 Flag)
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Besides the symbolical construction of the medals and the flags that symbolized
and legitimated the state power inside Afghanistan (presumably representing the
influence of the Afghan elites), the symbolic ceremonies of the period between 1919 and
1929 become more interesting. This is so because it was during these occasions that the
state and the nationalists propagated Afghanistan as a nation among other nations of the
world. It was in these symbolic ceremonies where people were brought, lined up, and
grouped to listen to and watch Afghanistan’s modern statesmen.
The ceremonies themselves varied because there were many kinds of symbolic
ceremonies. For instance, they could be from the birthday or wedding ceremony and
celebration of a royal family member or the celebration of the departure or arrival of
Afghan students from and to abroad.147 However, the major symbolic ceremonies of the
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For the images of the flags that were adopted in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1933,
see Borjian (1999). His piece also offers a useful description and the images of the flags of
Afghanistan after 1933 until the Taliban who had a simple plain white flag.
147
In 1922 when Afghanistan’s first 40 students (all of them from the upper class
families) arrived safely in Paris, the Government had asked people in the center of provinces to
gather together and pray and wish for their successes in Europe. One of those occasions, for
example, took place in the provincial town of Farah where the judges, government officials, and
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era were Jashan-e Isteqlal or Celebration of Independence Day (August 19), Loya Jirga
or the Great Assembly, Eid’ul-Fitr (the three-day celebration that takes place after
Ramadan), Eid’ ul-Adha (the three-day Sacrifice Celebration), and Nawruz (New Year’s
Day, March 21st in Afghanistan). In order to understand the proceedings of these
symbolic ceremonies and how they were used by the Afghan state to symbolize
Afghanistan and what kind of people attended and where the ceremonies took place, one
of Jashan-e Isteqlal’s ceremonies is thoroughly explored here.
The 1928 celebration of Jashan-e Isteqlal was commemorated as Amanullah
Khan returned to Afghanistan following an eight month trip abroad where he went to
symbolize Afghanistan in the world. Amanullah’s trip will be first explored and through
it, the Jashan-e Isteqlal of 1928. Amanullah’s visits of India, Egypt, Germany, and
Russia are thoroughly explored. The main reason behind this is because a full discussion
of Amanullah’s trip needs more time and space, which are limited in this thesis.
Amanullah traveled to various countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. However,
Amanullah and his delegation visited, saw something, and did something in every
following cities, seas, and ports of Asia, Africa, and Europe where they traveled to and
from: Kabul, Ghazni, Muqor, and Qandahar cities in Afghanistan; Quetta, Karachi, and
Bombay in British India; SS Rajputana, the Passenger Carrier Ship in the Arabian Sea;
Ports of Aden and Said in Yemen and Egypt; Cairo in Egypt; Naples, Rome, Vatican, and
Milan in Italy; Paris, Leon, and Lyon in France; Brussels in Belgium; Zurich and Geneva
government employees of both the military and civilian administrations gathered. “The people of
Farah,” Tulu-e Afghan reported, “thanked the Afghan students for studying in Europe, wished
them success, and were grateful for Emir Amanullah Khan.” See the full article, “Maref
Khawhay’ha-e Farah: Educational Support of Farah,” Tulu-e Afghan, 2nd Year, No. 1 (1922), p. 2.
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in Switzerland; Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden in Germany; London, Birmingham,
Manchester, and Ireland in the United Kingdom; Warsaw in Poland; Minsk in Belarus;
Leningrad (now, St. Petersburg), Moscow, Kiev, and Crimea Tatars in Soviet Union;
Black Sea, Istanbul, and Ankara in Turkey; Tbilisi, and Baku in Soviet Union again;
Caspian Sea, Rasht, and Tehran in Iran; and Herat, Farah, Qandahar, Muqor, Ghazni, and
Kabul in Afghanistan.
(Figure 15, Amanullah’s Approximate Trip Routes, 1927-1928)

Part Two: Externally Symbolized Afghanistan

Between 1919 and 1929, one of the main objectives of the Afghan nationalists
was to sell and symbolize Afghanistan abroad. The new flags, the new medals, the new
schools, and the new roshanfekran or the elites who by now made a well-composed class
of diplomats, writers, poets, and government employees had to become “serviceable and
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useful to the country and nation so that the Government and nation of Afghanistan may
make a name and gain great renown in the civilized world and take its proper place
among the civilized Powers of the world.”148Among the “civilized Powers of the world,”
Russia was the first to recognize Afghanistan as an independent sovereign country in
1919 when Afghanistan’s War of Independence, known also as the Third Anglo-Afghan
War, ended. After Russia, several other countries followed. According to Mir Ghulam
Mohammad Ghobar, who himself became a symbol and also symbolizer of Afghanistan-e
jadid or new Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s, the Government of Afghanistan
established diplomatic relationships with nine foreign countries between 1919 and
1928.149 These countries were Iran, Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, France, Poland,
Switzerland, Liberia, and Japan. In addition to these nine, Afghan Government signed a
treaty with Italy in 1921 and several treaties with Turkey in the 1920s. They sent a
delegation to the United States too, however; the United States did not establish
diplomatic relationships until the late 1930s.150
The mega effect of recognition of Afghanistan as a sovereign state by foreign
countries happened when Amanullah Khan as a sovereign oriental monarch visited
Europe. Although Amanullah’s trip is remotely studied and widely popularized by the

Amanullah’s Proclamation; available in Ludwig Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A
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Adamec (1967).
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Afghan historical narratives,151 there is not yet available a careful and satisfactory
explanation of the trip’s complexity, its significance, and its implication for nationalism
in Afghanistan. Therefore, the hope is that this chapter will shed some lights on the trip’s
complexity, significance, and implication for nationalism in Afghanistan.
From the departure of Amanullah and his delegation from Kabul to their arrival
back to Kabul, everything related to and happened during and in the trip had a special
significance to the Afghan nationalists: Amanullah was representing an independent
nation, Afghanistan. Even before leaving Kabul, the Afghan state had already planned a
grand farewell ceremony for Amanullah and his delegation. On November 29, 1927,
Amanullah gathered about 12,000 people in the newly built palace, Del Kusha or Heart’s
Delight where he offered his farewell statement. The people present at the event were
civilian and military personnel including students from the various schools of Kabul.
Some of the people were brought as far as six kilometer away from Kabul city. In the
ceremonial speech, Amanullah downplayed the existence of several diverse ethnic
communities in Afghanistan. He rather impressed upon people that they were all Afghans
without regards to what ethnic and tribal group to which they belonged. “Afghanistan did
not have,” Amanullah stated, “ethnic and tribal communities such as Hindu, Hazara,
Shia, Sunni, Ahmadzai, and Popalzai. Afghans are all one people, and that is Afghan.”
This farewell statement was reported to be emotional and apparently made Amanullah
and the attendees to cry several times. 152 After talking about the importance of
independence of Afghanistan and the necessity of the trip to introduce Afghanistan to the
151
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world and saying-goodbye to the people, he and his delegation left Kabul to Quetta, then
the Afghanistan’s southern border town between the country and British India
Amanullah Khan’s World Tour: India, Egypt, and Europe

Once Amanullah and his delegation crossed Afghanistan’s border and took the
British-provided railway from Quetta towards port cities of India, Karachi and Bombay,
his trip became more political, more nationalistic, and above all, more symbolic. While in
Bombay, he did not only symbolize himself as an “Afghan monarch” but he also
preached Pan-Islamism and nationalism. In Bombay, from December 12, 1927 until
December 17, he had several official dinners with the senior British colonial officials in
India including the city’s governor. He and his delegation also toured the city; visited
several Indian Muslim mosques, associations, and schools; and above all, met in person
and communicated through letters with the Afghan diasporic community of Bombay,
Pathans of India, Turkic-Perso community of Qizilbashes, and Indian Parsees’
community.153
For Pan-Islamic outreach, the Indian Muslims’ Khilafat Movement that sought
Pan-Islamic Unity after the decline of the Ottoman Empire as the seat of Khilafat
organized a special event for Amanullah on Friday December 16, 1927. Amanullah was
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The Turkic Qizilbash Community was partly a military, partly a civilian, and partly a
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scheduled to speak for nearly 3,000 people who had gathered in a large open area. They
had a chair placed in the middle of the venue where Amanullah was asked to sit. Then,
each representative from the Khilafat Movement read their speech, and praised
Amanullah Khan, Padsha-e Isteqlal Bakhsha-e Afghanistan or the king and giver of
Afghanistan’s independence. The Muslims of India stated that Amanullah “is not only the
young, brave, and ghazi king of Afghans, not only wants independence and progress of
his valiant nation but he was also a person who wants independence, unity, and progress
of all Muslims. We call upon him as it is also his desires to ask for independence and
rights of all Muslims, and we all believe in his spiritual and thoughtful ability to do
so.”154
When the speeches of Indian Muslims were finished, Amanullah stood and
delivered a Pan-Islamic speech (in Persian via an Urdu translator) in which he asked for
unity, brotherhood, education, and support among Muslims. After the event, Amanullah
went back to his residence in the Government House of Bombay, and within hour after
the lunch, Amanullah appeared back in Bombay’s Grand Friday Mosque where he
offered the Friday Khutbah, the sermon and led the prayers.155
However, in contrast to the Pan-Islamic importance of Amanullah’s meetings
with Muslims of India, his meeting with “Afghans of Bombay” and “Pathans of India”
makes his stay in India more interesting and more nationalistic. One day before his
meeting with the Muslims of India, the Afghans who were residing in Bombay had
154
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arranged a special evening with Amanullah and his delegation in the Afghan Consulate. It
was at this three-hour meeting that Amanullah asked Afghans who were residing in India
to take Afghan passports and tazkaras in order to become Afghan citizens so that they
could not be branded wrongly “as Turks and Iranian.” During the meeting, Amanullah
talks about Afghanistan’s independence and reforms, and their importance to Afghans
both inside and outside Afghanistan. He told the Afghans in India:
If Afghanistan was not the name of a holy homeland, I would have not been respected
and honored by anybody. The Indian brothers and the Government of India would have
not honored me this much. You cannot depend on anybody, except your God and your
holy watan, homeland. If you are away from your homeland, what do you need: God and
country? You have both. Obey Him first. Although this advice is unnecessary because I
have heard that Afghans are increasingly getting closer and consolidated, I still ask you to
do good and be good towards people, make clean deals, do good so much that people
would not take you to courts…..Although I can recognize from your harsh eyes, unhappy
foreheads, and your black eyebrows that you are Afghans, not everybody knows you.
Therefore, get yourself passport and tazkara……this is a necessity that the entire world
have gotten it. You also get it…. Sacrifice for your country….and I am thankful for God
that Afghans are healthy, courageous, and patriotic. I ask God to have you dignified and
exalted. Long Live our Dear Afghanistan.156

In addition to his meeting with Afghans in Bombay, Amanullah exchanged letters
with Muslims of Rohila. It is studied that Muslims of Rohila are considered to be of
Afghans’ descendants. It is argued that the communities of Pashtuns-Pathans-or Afghans
who lived (and live) in India were the Afghans who spread throughout South Asia before
the establishment of the modern state of Afghanistan in the eighteenth century. These
Afghans traveled there for trade or they were part of the military expeditions of the
Muslim rulers. Although they integrated themselves with the cosmopolitan environment
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of India, they kept their Afghan tribal and religious identity through tazkara or
genealogy. 157
In their letter to Amanullah Khan, the Muslims of Rohila expressed their support
to him and his nationalism programs for Afghanistan. According to Popalzai (1986), in
1920 when Mahmud Tarzi then the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan went to India to
settle the final negotiations of the peace treaty of 1919 with the British, he was informed
by the Muslims of Rohila that the “border” between Afghanistan and British India had to
be “Rohila, a land that is in reality a part of Afghanistan but located in Hindustan.” 158
After touring the city of Bombay including its municipality, attending an air
show, leading a Friday Prayer in the Bombay’s Grand Mosque, meeting with Afghans of
Bombay, and exchanging letters with Muslims of Rohila, Amanullah and his delegation
boarded the SS Rajputana, the British Passenger Carrier Ship. They traveled through the
great Arabian Sea and on December 21, after a four-day trip via the Arabian Sea the
Rajputana, arrived in the Port of Aden where Sir Francis Henry, the British envoy to
Kabul who was accompanying Amanullah and his delegation, had already planned the
activities of Amanullah and his delegation. In Aden, he was met by the British Colonial
officials of Port Aden and the Governor of Aden.159
From Aden, Rajputana traveled to Port Said in Egypt where Amanullah was
greeted by Fuad I, King of Egypt, and Governor and the Head of Police of Suez. From
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there they went to Cairo by train. He was welcomed in Cairo by a cheering crowd that
the government had assembled. Amanullah, the Padsha-e Isteqlal Bakhsha-e
Afghanistan, with a reputation as Pan-Islamist, anti-colonial and nationalist calls was well
received in Egypt where Egyptian nationalism was in a critical period. The struggle for
full self-determination against the British and their desire to modernize further provided
similarities between Afghanistan and Egypt. However, this interaction of Egyptian
nationalism and nationalism in Afghanistan did not convey the fact that Egypt has been
far earlier impacted by the intellectual and material ideas of the Europeans dates back to
the 1790s invasion by Napoleon. Egyptian reforms of Muhammad Ali and his successors
in 1800s until its occupation by the British in 1882 presented a history of nationalism in
Egypt. Yet, according to the Egyptian nationalists, the difference between Egypt and
Afghanistan was that Afghanistan, as a Muslim country, was free and independent from
colonialism while Egypt was not. Popalzai (1986) writes that on December 24, a day
before Amanullah arrived in Egypt, Egypt’s second oldest newspaper, Al-Ahram or the
Pyramids had an article about Amanullah’s and his delegation’s arrival to the country.
The newspaper’s report read as follows: “O’ you people who seek independence! O’ you
people who love freedom. O’ you people who call for the independence of people.
Tomorrow, in your homeland, the independent king is going to arrive. The courageous
Afghan who admires independence, freedom, and the desires of people, then, honor and
admire him.” 160

Ibid, 63. See also pages 64-70 about the other newspapers’ of Egypt that had written
about Amanullah’s arrival to Egypt, and the preparation for his arrival in Cairo.
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During his thirteen-day stay in Egypt, in addition to all formalities of the politics
and diplomacy that took place between Fuad I and Amanullah, the Afghan ruler also did
a number of symbolic activities that intended to represent Afghanistan in Egypt and
beyond.161 For instance, to learn about the modernization or nationalism of Egypt,
Amanullah and his delegation visited almost all of the popular established symbols of
Egypt such as Museum of Egypt, the Pyramids, National Bank of Egypt, Ministry of
Education, Egyptian Library of Cairo, and several primary, secondary and higher
educational institutions of Cairo including Al-Azhar. They even went to see both the old
and new parts of Cairo where new roads and new houses had been built.162 Additionally,
Amanullah was invited to attend one of the sessions of Egypt’s Parliament, and held a
grand meeting with the members of Egyptian Media. In both of these sessions, the talks
were about the Islamic unity, anti-colonialism, and progress of the Muslim nations.163 On
January 6 of 1928 when Amanullah’s thirteen-day visit finished in Egypt, he embarked
an Italian passenger ship in Alexandria from where he started his tour of Europe.
Naples was the first port of entry for Amanullah in Europe. He and his delegation
traveled to nine European countries that included Italy, France, Belgium, Switzerland,
Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and Soviet Union. For the narrative in this
work, no one country will be highlighted over the other. Rather, his trip to Europe will
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be discussed as a European trip rather than an Italian or French or Russian or English
one.164
The European tour had a number of symbolic meanings for Amanullah, for the
Afghan nationalists, for the pan-Islamic Muslims, and for the European themselves. For
the Europeans, Amanullah himself becomes a symbol. In each of the countries and
particular cities that he visited, the official and public understanding was the arrival of a
modern progressive Oriental monarch with his wife and delegation to Europe—a
continent that was itself recovering from its major inter-imperial and inter-European war,
World War One.
Amanullah was not the first Oriental monarch to have gone on a European State
visit. In 1867, Khedive Ismail of Egypt was invited by Napoleon III to visit France where
he toured the Exposition Universelle. When the Khedive came back, he tried to build
large open boulevards like Paris in Cairo and implement other symbols and innovations
similar to those he observed in France. In 1873 Naser al-Din Shah of Persia toured
Europe where he saw the symbols of Europe’s urbanate infrastructure. When he came
back to Iran, he tried to make Tehran, Persia’s capital, like Paris. Amanullah’s
grandfather, Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901) wished to travel at least once to the United

The treatment of Amanullah’s visit to Europe as a European rather a French or
German or Polish or Russian does not meant that Amanullah’s visit and impression were the
same in each of these countries. There were differences, which will be pointed in the course of
the discussion.
164
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Kingdom/Europe. However, he never made it, though his son and Amanullah’s uncle,
Nasirullah Khan, traveled to London in 1895.165
Each of the countries in Europe where Amanullah Khan went tried to take
advantage of his visit and use it as some-kind of a diplomatic symbol in order to increase
their inter-European and post-World War One political and imperial status. For example,
on April 29, 1928 when Amanullah arrived in Poland, which had become an independent
nation-state in 1918 after a century and half rule and “partition” by imperial powers,
Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia, the visit was highlighted by the host country as
evidence of their newly won sovereignty of the nation-states.166 In France, for example,
the French government used the royal visit to show its glory and hospitality as a
European power. It is recorded that the government removed from Musée du Louvre
Napoleon’s bed and offered it to Amanullah to sleep in it because the French had said to
Amanullah “we want you to be comfortable on this bed.” However, the report continues
that Amanullah did not accept it, and replied: “I am a soldier. My ancestors during
Napoleon’s time were also soldiers, and like me they also lived in discomforting and
difficult situations.”167 When Amanullah refuses to sleep on Napoleon’s bed, it surprises
the French so much, as the story goes, that they symbolize him as Napoleon by saying
For Khedive Ismail’s and Naser al-Din Shah’s visits of Europe, see Afshin Marashi
Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power & the State, 1870-1940 (Seattle: University of Washington
Press), 18-48.
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that “Napoleon of the East at this time is this person. He should sleep in Napoleon’s bed
since he came to his country as guest.”168 Apart from this symbolization the French praise
Amanullah’s reforms back in Afghanistan. During the speeches, they remind him that it
was under him that Afghan students were sent abroad for studying and it was Amanullah
who thought about opening up Afghanistan’s doors to the outside world and admired his
appreciation of the material progress of Europe. A large number of Afghan students lived
in France at the time of Amanullah’s visit. France had also an exclusive right in the
discovery of Afghanistan’s ancient symbols as well. In 1922, Afghanistan granted
France’s archeologists an exclusive right to look for Afghanistan’s ancient historical
symbols and societies. Their researches and findings of Afghanistan’s past became so
symbolically important for Afghan nationalists, and some of the nationalists were taught
and educated by the French. One of such persons was Ahmad Ali Kohzad (1907-1983),
who was educated by the French Archeological Delegation to Afghanistan. Kohzad and
Afghan historians used the findings of Afghanistan’s past by French scholars in late
1920s, early 1930s, and 1940s to construct a modern national history of Afghanistan’s
ancient, medieval, and contemporary times.
Amanullah’s progressive view was praised throughout his stay in France. During
his visit of Paris Municipality, the city’s mayor described the Afghan monarch as “the
enlightened monarch and a lover of progress. Paris is happy to host such a firm and
steady monarch, who from the onset to the throne in Afghanistan had shown friendly
signs to our country. Your visit of us has made us happier. Your noble country
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Afghanistan, which only brings good and no harm to us, is the champion of the Orient. At
one time, around the name of Alexander the Great, there were shared commonalities of
civilization.”169
In addition to the symbolization of Amanullah as the Napoleon of the East and
reminding him of Afghanistan’s ancient history, the French arranged for him to visit
many of the French national symbols so that he could remember France’s achievements
while visiting other European countries. Amanullah visited University of Paris; France
National Library; National Museum, Louvre; France’s Military Academy in Saint-Cyr;
and Allied Club in Paris. Additionally, Amanullah was invited by Paris’ Orientalists to
speak for them. In the Paris Orientalist club, they served Amanullah “only tea,” the
symbol of the Orient.170 He also visited several schools in France including Lycee
Michelet where Afghan students (and among them, Prince Hedayatullah Khan) were
studying.171
Like the French who used Amanullah to impress him and his delegation of the
achievements of France as a European power, and the Poles who used him to further their
cause of independence in a shaky and unstable post-World War One Europe, other
European heads of state and monarchs used Amanullah as well. Germany that was using
all symbols and possibilities available to recover her losses of World War One and to find
ways to pay the post-war reparations tried to use Amanullah’s visit to boost its diplomatic
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status as a power in Europe and beyond.172 Germans arranged for Amanullah and his
delegation to attend several official state-dinners. They also arranged for him to visit air
shows, several warfare factories, and Berlin’s Municipality. During his visit of Technical
University of Berlin, he was granted an honorary doctorate for being “a progressive,
conscious, and peace-loving king of Afghanistan who had really and meaningfully gained
the right of a doctorate and professorship in the modernization of human
civilization.”173Additionally, Amanullah visited many other cities of Germany such as
Potsdam, Leipzig, and Dresden where he went to see particularly the warfare factories.
As he did in Paris, he also toured Berlin’s Museum, Library, and met in person in several
occasions with Afghan students who were studying in Germany. 174
Like France and Germany where Amanullah and his delegation became symbols
of modernity, progressivism, and reforms, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union tried
also to use Amanullah and his delegation. In the United Kingdom, in addition to his
official diplomatic meetings and attending air shows, he took flights over London city.
Furthermore, even though Afghanistan is a landlocked country and has no use for
172
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submarines, Amanullah was granted such a tour. He also visited British Museum and
library and traveled to several other cities across the United Kingdom. In addition to the
doctorate degree that he received in Germany, the Oxford University honored him with a
second honorary doctorate degree; this time the degree was in law. And finally, as the
French had symbolized him as the Napoleon of the East by the French, Amanullah was
praised by the British who compared the Afghan ruler to Peter the Great of Russia
because of his reforms.175
Unlike Western European countries where Amanullah was symbolized as a
modern progressive oriental monarch, in the Soviet Union he was introduced as an antiimperialist statesman who freed Afghanistan from the imperial domination of Britain. In
the Soviet Union, his visit was symbolized more as an anti-colonialist and less as a
nationalist. After arriving in Moscow on May 4, 1928, Amanullah had official dinners
with the Soviet Union leaders including the president, then Mikhail Kalinin. During the
dinner address, the Soviet President mentioned that Soviet Union was “proud and happy
to recall that it was the first government to recognize the new government of
Afghanistan, and became happy as the country became independent.”176
Amanullah toured the Kremlin. He attended a horse race tournament—an
occasion the Soviets named it Independent Afghanistan.177 In addition, Amanullah toured
an “Afghan Military Exhibition,” which was held in the Red Army’s headquarter where
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there was a sign that read: “Long Live Afghanistan’s Independence.” In the exhibition,
there were Afghan symbols that were brought from Kabul Afghanistan. According to
Popalzai (1986), the symbols were “maps of Anglo-Afghan Wars, maps and copies of
treaties, Afghan military outfits, Amanullah’s decrees including his decree that banned
slavery in Afghanistan, and pictures of Afghan military generals and Kabul that showed
the new city, Darul Aman.” In addition to the military exhibition, there was also
“Afghanistan Press Exhibition” where articles and publications of Russian press and
Afghan Press were put to display.178
The visit to the Soviet Union and the other European countries ended on May 16,
1928 when the king and his delegation traveled via a southern route from Moscow
towards the Crimea and Black Sea and entered Turkey. Amanullah’s European visits had
multiple symbolic meanings. The Europeans used and manipulated Amanullah and his
delegation as a symbol in the post-World War One state of affairs. Amanullah also took
advantage of his trip. He used his trip in every European country to symbolize
Afghanistan as an independent nation in the world that was still divided among and
dominated by the European imperial powers. Therefore, in Europe, Amanullah’s trip
became symbolically important for Afghan nationalists and significant for Islamic
nationalists in demonstrating the new pan-Islamic anti-colonial nationalism. This was at
least the impression of nationalists and the press, anti-colonialists, and pan-Islamists in
Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, and India.
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Take for example the report of Captain Wickham, the Military Attaché of the
British Legation in Kabul from where he wrote to London his impression about how
Amanullah’s trip was received by the Afghans and Iranians: “The Aman-i Afghan,” wrote
Captain Wickham, “has published an extract from the Persian newspaper Sitarah-i Iran,
dealing with the king’s visit to the Pope in Rome. In this article emphasis is laid on the
fact that the King departed from the usual custom of kissing the Pope’s hand. In the
writer’s opinion, King Amanullah by his action has proved to the world the greatness of
modern Islamic nations and the fact that they are equal to European nations. This very
illogical article concludes with the sentence: The Pope, who outwardly has nothing to do
with politics, has obviously realized this point (i.e., greatness of the modern Islamic
world), and it would be much better if the politicians of Europe would understand it
too.”179 In addition to Aman-e Afghan, other newspapers of Afghanistan covered the trip
from country to country where Amanullah and his delegation traveled. 180
Amanullah’s pan-Islamic nationalism and modernism calls were received well in
Turkey where he and his delegation arrived from Soviet Union. Turkish nationalists
including Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were already aware of Amanullah’s state-building
efforts in Afghanistan where Turkish teachers and military officers were hired to train the
Afghan forces. When Tawfiq Big, Turkish Minister to Soviet Union, was interviewed in
Moscow about Amanullah’s visit to Turkey, he replied that “Afghanistan and Turkey
were friendly and brotherly countries…. the Afghan nation is progressing through the
179
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educational programs of Amanullah Shah Ghazi. Amanullah Shah is a big person, and his
works are for the good of his own nation. In Turkey, there will be a very celebratory and
warm welcome for His Majesty the King of Afghanistan.”181 After meeting Ataturk and
going through all of the diplomatic formalities and statements, Amanullah and his
delegation went to Istanbul where they spent a week. Since they could not go to Iran
through Turkish borders because of some disputes between Turks and Iranians, he took
the Asia Minor route where they went first to Tbilisi and then to Baku in Azerbaijan.
From there via the Caspian Sea, they arrived in Iran.182 The visit in Iran was short. Since
Afghanistan had (and has) a large Shia community that had religious and cultural
connections with the religious and cultural sites and institutions in Iran, Reza Shah
Pahlavi, the Iranian ruler suggested to Amanullah during his visit of Iran to “allow
Afghan Shias to have freedom in celebrating their religious rituals.” It is said that
Amanullah replied to Reza Shah that “all Afghans have equal rights without regards to
their religious sects.”183
From Iran, Amanullah and his delegation enters into Herat, Afghanistan’s western
province. Once Amanullah’s and his delegation tour ended in the foreign countries, it was
now the turn to Afghanistan where Amanullah and his delegation had already arranged
the preparations to propagate and symbolize the trip to Afghan people. In Herat, which
was having its summer season in June of 1928, Amanullah did not stay for more than a
night because the weather was hot. Upon his arrival in Herat and in his honor and safe
181
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return, thirteen cannons were fired. From Herat, the trip took an eastern route towards
Qandahar, Muqor, and Ghazni. To symbolize and propagate effectively the arrival of the
king, a twenty-four member Reception Committee was created in Kabul. The committee
made sure that on the king’s route to Kabul, in each stop—Farah, Qandahar, Muqor, and
Ghazni—triumphal arches were to be erected and covered with Afghanistan’s flags.
Every city where the king was to arrive had to be illuminated and kept clean. In every
city, all of the government employees, both civilian and military personnel as well as the
district and provincial governors, students and teachers, and the mayor, had to be present
to welcome the king. In the provincial capital during the first night of the arrival, the
governor had to arrange an official dinner for the king and his delegation. The Governor
of Kabul along with fifty students, military commanders of Kabul Corps, and two
military divisions had to be present in Muqor and Ghazni where they were assigned to
welcome the king, and have arranged two planes to sprinkle flowers and escort the king
and his delegation to Kabul.
In Kabul the government employees, students and teachers both female and male,
and the mayor were assembled in lines from Dehmazang until Qasr-e Del Kusha to
welcoming back the king. The city was symbolized with Afghanistan’s flags and was
illuminated for three days and three nights. The first three days of the king’s arrival were
announced as national Eid holiday. Representatives were invited from all the provinces to
Kabul in order to welcome and honor the king. The Kabul Government, Municipality and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged official banquets and entertainments for the first
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four days upon the king’s arrival. The religious leaders and mullahs were rewarded for
the king’s safe return.184
When Amanullah’s departure to and arrival from abroad were signified as a
‘national’ symbol of Afghanistan-e jadid/nawa-e Afghanistan or the new Afghanistan, he
himself was now more than ever committed to celebrate that symbol. After a month and
half in Kabul, where he and his delegation arrived on July 1, 1928, Kabul was now soon
to celebrate another grand symbolic event: the annual symbol, Jashan-e Isteqlal or the
Independence Day on August 19. This year’s Jashan-e Isteqlal, however, was in so many
ways different from the previous ones. First, this year’s Jashan was planned to coincide
with another symbol of Afghanistan, which in theory and also practice supersedes all
symbols of Afghanistan. This was the grand assembly or Loya Jirga of 1928. Loya Jirga
is a problematic but important institution in Afghanistan. Jirga, if to look at it locally and
culturally, means assembly or gathering or meeting. In this local context, Jirga has a nonpolitical, non-hegemonic, and non-militaristic purpose. It is usually used by the local
Afghans to resolve their local and community problems. However, when it comes to
Loya Jirga or Grand Assembly, it takes a political, hegemonic, and militaristic purpose
because the Afghan state has been using Loya Jirga to produce legitimacy in the national
and international levels.185 The second difference of this year’s Jashan was because of
the king’s return from abroad, and the new symbols he had brought with himself.

For full details of activities and preparations for Amanullah’s and his delegation arrival
back to Afghanistan, see Popalzai (1986), 257-288. Also see Government of the Great Britain
(1928), 889-902.
185
What is Loya Jirga and what are its historical background and how the Afghan state
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According to Ronald Wide, the British journalist who attended 1928’s Jashan-e
Isteqlal, Amanullah was ready to symbolize this year’s Jashan-e Isteqlal with more joy
and new symbols as he had learned about them from traveling abroad. “Three days before
the annual celebration of Independence Day, August 1928,” wrote Wide, “great things
were expected when that day dawned. The king was to speak, and it was thought that he
would have something further to say of the programme for his kingdom. He would detail
the events of the past few months [about his trip], and tell the delegates to his annual
jirga, or meeting, of the honours that had been heaped upon him in all the cities of the
West.”186
As matter of fact, his trip abroad had already turned into a symbol—a series of
films—which were shown for three consecutive weeks in the newly opened cinema—a
symbol of modernization that Amanullah brought to Afghanistan from abroad. Who
watched exactly the films is not clear. However, there is a high chance that the audience
of the films was the Afghan government employees and other officials.187 In addition to
the display of the films and tennis tournaments, which were running consecutively days
before this year’s Jashan-e Isteqlal, the venue of this year’s jashan was even different
from its usual place. This year it was to be celebrated in Paghman, a foothill valley about
12 miles northwest of Kabul where Amanullah was born and where there now was
standing a triumphal arch, Takhta-e Zafar similar to that of Arc de Triumph in Paris.

and important study of Loya Jirga, see Mohammad Jamil Hanifi’s “Editing the Past: Colonial
Production of Hegemony through the Loya Jerga in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies, 27, no. 2
(2004), 295-322.
186
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187
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Takhta-e Zafar was built to celebrate Afghanistan’s fallen men who fought during the
Third Anglo-Afghan War, known also as War of Independence in 1919.188
What is more interesting than takhat-e zafar to observe of this year’s Jashan-e
Isteqlal’s is the range of several other activities, which had symbolic meanings to
Amanullah and the Afghan nationalists. In addition to having invited the diplomats of
several countries to observe the symbols of Afghanistan in Paghman, Amanullah invited
a German Mobile Opera company to play in Paghman. The company, was initially first
invited by the British colonial government in Peshawar, however, the Afghan state
arranged for them to come to Afghanistan for the Jashan as well. According to Wild
(1933), who was present in the Jashan, the opera’s actors were a German Jew and his
wife, a South African Dutch. Their son and daughter, one born in Paris and the other in
South America, were in the cast. There was a husband of the daughter, a New Yorker,
and an additional property man who was distinctly Italian. For Amanullah it was
important to symbolize not only Afghanistan in Afghanistan but in the world.
188
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“Appropriately,” wrote Wild, “it seemed the international atmosphere of the new
Afghanistan was being maintained” by having invited foreign diplomats in the Jashan
and playing for them Western opera in an oriental land.189
But still more interesting this year’s Jashan was to see the fruitfulness of the
educational reforms that the Afghan state had undertaken in Kabul and beyond in the
country. Now, during the Jashan, the students could easily symbolize themselves, the
king, and the Afghan nation. As part of many symbolic activities that were arranged for
the Jashan, a combined group of 98 students were collected from several schools of
Kabul to prove to Amanullah that he could be confident that Afghanistan had now a wellcomposed class of citizens who could represent the country at-home and abroad. Out of
these 98 students, 95 of them represented Afghanistan’s first educational symbol,
Habibya College. The 95 students from Habibya were divided into four groups, 20, 20,
20, and 25. The first 20-student group had to collectively read aloud for “His Majesty the
King,” their article, Khair-e Maqdam Isteqlal or the Beginning of Independence.190 The
second 20-student group of Habibya also had their article read aloud, which was about
the praise of Amanullah’s works for Afghanistan: “Shah Ghazi emir Amanullah Khan: de
adel-aqel-amel-kamel; mulke-mahkam de qawi de Afghanistan; wurka isteqlal watan ta
padshah: kamal-jamal-jalal-afzal—Amanullah, the just, wise, doer, and accomplisher;
Afghanistan is the strong homeland; the king has given the homeland independence;
189
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Amanullah: his accomplishment, magnificence, majesty, and excellence.”191 And the
third group, fourth group, and other students continued, individually, with their articles
read aloud in front of and to the king and the audience. Each student had individual
articles assigned on a different subject. For example, one had written his article on “the
importance of chemistry,” another on “structure of sentences in English,” another on
“Turkish Language,” another on the “geography of Kabul,” another on “Pashtu
language,” and so on many other subjects.
When Jashan-e Isteqlal of 1928 was ended after a week of celebration and
symbolization of Afghanistan where now a European opera could play and tennis
tournament could be held, “Amanullah was pleased…. [and was] congratulated.” wrote
Wild. “His country [Amanullah thought],” Wild continued, “was already civilized.”192
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(Figure, 16: Amanullah Speaking in Jashan-e Isteqlal 1928 in Paghman)
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"Williams Afghan Media Project: Item Viewer." Crowd Gathered at the Amphitheater.
http://contentdm.williams.edu/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/wamp&CISOPTR=939&CI
SOBOX=1&REC=7 (accessed March 7, 2012).
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(Figure, 17: Amanullah’s brother, Enayatullah Khan, left with the white coat and crossing legs,
during the Tennis Tournament in Paghman)

Conclusion
Nationalism in Afghanistan: A Colonial, Elite Idea

As it was discussed in the four chapters of this thesis, nationalism in Afghanistan was
a colonial idea, and the Afghan nationalists or roshanfekran such as Mahmud Tarzi or
Amanullah Khan or Mir Ghulam M. Ghobar adapted and adopted this idea into an
Afghan idea. Using a post-modernist analysis of nationalism, this thesis argued that the
definition of an Afghan nation and therefore the subsequent nationalism in Afghanistan
were colonial constructs. Its foundation, such as the boundaries of Afghanistan, was
territorialized and mapped by colonial activities in the nineteenth century. Before the
colonial construction of Afghanistan, the country that is now known as Afghanistan did
not have any existence. Of course, like many other countries in the region, the modern
territory of Afghanistan and its people the Afghans were part of the sociopolitical
communities that existed in the region and the Afghans interacted with the wider world.
However, the ancientness of the modern territory of Afghanistan does not necessarily
institute, as the Afghan nationalists claimed, an Afghanistan that was always
“Afghanistan.”
What made the modern nation of Afghanistan were a set of convergent facts that were
associated with the colonial activities and efforts in the nineteenth century. Some of these
colonial activities that were discussed in this thesis were Mountstuart Elphinstone
Mission 1808-1809 and his book An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815); the
colonial wars such as the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Battle of Maiwand (18781880), and the colonial treaties such as the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 1873. These
colonial activities constructed the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan. This
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foundation was the name, territory, and history of Afghanistan. They were constructed,
labeled, and defined by the power of colonial knowledge, especially the British.
The traditional explanation of the studies of nationalism in Afghanistan is hegemonic.
This is so because the story represents the narrative of the role of great men such as
Habibullah Khan, Mahmud Tarzi, Amanullah Khan, and other Afghan personalities of
the period. Habibullah is praised for his initiation of small but important reforms in
Afghanistan and his son Amanullah is depicted as the champion of nationalism in
Afghanistan because of his exceptional modernist reforms in an inward-looking
conservative society. The Afghan state’s reforms, which were an imitation of the
colonial-European sociopolitical institutions, allowed people such as Ghobar to foster a
national idea that Afghanistan was an ancient country; its old names were Ariana and
Khurasan; and Afghan people had their own territory, culture, and history. That is why,
above all, Ghobar was successful in inventing the idea of Baba-ye Afghan, designating
Ahmad Shah Abdali-Durrani, the so-called founder of Afghanistan, as the father of
Afghans.
This national idea was propagated in the hegemonic institutions of the state.
Institutions such as army, bureaucracy, and the education system provided avenues to the
propagation. Especially, the education system, which was discussed in this thesis, was the
key for the propagation of a national idea. For schools such as Habibya College, the first
modern secular school in Afghanistan, the Afghan state created a modern statesanctioned curriculum in which a national idea was propagated through subjects such as
“history of Afghanistan,” “geography of Afghanistan,” and “literature of Afghanistan.”
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Additionally, the new state-sanctioned curriculum established a new kind of organization
of the schools, which emphasized order, discipline, and compliance. Once these schools
were established and were able to produce a well-composed patronized class of elites for
the Afghan state, these institutions were used to symbolize Afghanistan at-home and
abroad. Amanullah and his delegation, for example, in their eight-month tour of Asia and
Europe did not only symbolize Afghanistan, but they also themselves became symbol of
the country.
The study of nationalism in Afghanistan has not yet addressed the relationship
between those who promoted nationalism ideas, and those who consumed nationalism
ideas in Afghanistan. Many Afghans were illiterate in the period between 1901 and 1929
when the newspapers, such as Siraj al-Akhbar or its successor Aman-e Afghan, appeared.
Nationalistic ideas such as the concepts of nationality, nationhood, and modernity were
propagated by newspapers and Afghan nationalists. However, whether or not those
concepts were useful and delicate for ordinary Afghans is not clear. Much of the
nationalism activities happened in Kabul, a Persianate place that was connected
intellectually and materially to other regional and global Persianate and urban centers. In
this process, a certain class of Afghans, such as Mahmud Tarzi and Nader Shah and his
family who had access to external resources, played important roles.
The Afghan nationalists’ activities in this period were also similar in many ways to
nationalistic programs of countries such as Iran, Turkey, and nationalists in South Asia.
Amanullah’s reforms are, for example, mentioned to be similar to those of the reforms
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that Reza Shah and Mustafa Kamal Ataturk implemented in Iran and Turkey. A future
comparative analysis of them will be useful.
In addition to the problem of Kabul, a city that did not (and does not) represent
Afghanistan, the Afghans were (and are) a multiethnic, multiracial, multicultural, multilinguistic, and multi-religious people. This diversity makes nationalism in Afghanistan a
complex subject to study in addition to the problem of Kabul, problem of illiteracy of the
majority of Afghan people, problem of elitism, and problem of state-sanctioned
nationalism. For example, a complexity of nationalism in Afghanistan is the skewed
relationship between nationalism and language in Afghanistan. Many writings of Afghan
nationalists and the state printing publications were in Persian, which was the primary
language of the state and the elites. Although the relationship between language and
nationalism is not discussed in this thesis, it would be fruitful and will fill the gap of the
historiography of Afghanistan to conduct such a study to examine the role of language in
nationalism in Afghanistan because not all ethnic groups such as Nuristanis, Uzbeks,
Pashtuns, and others spoke Persian.
From what is discussed in this thesis, it can be concluded that nationalism in
Afghanistan was a colonially constructed idea. Locally, it was an elitist-state-sponsored
and symbolic idea that was consumed by a certain class of Afghans in Kabul. Therefore,
because of its elite character and elite consumption, nationalism in Afghanistan did not
permeate the larger society that was not a part of the so-called roshanfekran class that
emerged between 1901 and 1929 in Kabul.
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